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Constitutional Skepticism:
A Recovery and Preliminary Evaluation
Introduction
Over two centuries after its ratification, most Americans are still infatuated with their
Constitution. 1 At the beginning, few would have predicted this outcome. The Constitution was born
out of bitter conflict. 2 For many Antifederalists – perhaps a majority of the country 3 – the Constitutional
Convention amounted to a counterrevolution, a renunciation of everything that the War for
Independence had been fought to secure. 4 The ratification process was arguably illegal 5 and
1

See, e.g., “The AP- National Constitution Center Poll, August, 2012,
http://constitutioncenter.org/media/files/data_GfK_APNCC_Poll_August_GfK_2012_Topline_FINAL_1st_release.pdf (almost seven in ten Americans agree that “[t]he
United States Constitution is an enduring document that remains relevant today.”)
2
See generally PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788 (2010); WOODY
HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (2007); .Bruce Ackerman & Neil Katyal, Our
Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REV 475 (1995).
3
For a claim that “something like half the citizenry opposed [ratification],” see WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY
AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 249 & n. 56 (2007). There is no way to know the views of the many
women, people of color, and people lacking property, who could not participate in elections for the state
conventions. At a number of ratifying conventions, delegate selection districts were gerrymandered so as to
overstate the power of the Constitution’s supporters. See WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION, note 2, supra, at 149; PAULENE MAIER, RATIFICATION, note 2, supra, at 115. Supporters of the
Constitution cleverly structured voting rules so that the conventions were faced with a stark choice between
ratification of the document as a whole or continuation of the unpopular Articles of Confederation. See JACK N.
RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 96 (1996). Many people who
ultimately supported the Constitution would have preferred a middle position involving amendments to the
original draft. See PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION, note 2, supra, at 50-69, 261, 395-96. Rhode Island, the last state to
ratify the Constitution, did so only after Congress threatened a trade embargo against the state and a majority of
delegates to the convention disobeyed explicit instructions from their constituents. See Bruce Ackerman & Neil
Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, note 2, supra, at 538-39.
4
See, e.g., PAULENE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, note 2, supra, at 91 (quoting
Luther Martin’s charge that delegates from Virginia and other “large states” sought to destroy the states and
establish a monarchy.) For a comprehensive collection of Antifederalist rhetoric, see THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,
(HERBERT J. STORING, ED. 1981).
5
Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation provided that “[T]he Articles of this confederation shall be
inviolably observed by every State, and the union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alternation at any time
hereafter be made in any of them, unless such alternation be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be
afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State.” Article VII of the Constitution violated these legal
requirements in numerous ways. It authorized scrapping the “perpetual union under the Articles upon approval of
only nine states, upon approval of state conventions rather than state legislatures, and without the agreement of
Congress. For a comprehensive discussion, see Bruce Ackerman & Neil Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, note
2, supra, at 479-487. For a claim that the Constitution was legal on the ground that the Articles were a treaty that
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unquestionably marred by serious procedural irregularities, 6 various political shenanigans, 7 blatant
coercion, 8 and outright violence. 9 Ratification almost didn’t happen at all, and the process left many
Antifederalists angry and disillusioned.
The Federalists had promised to fix some of the problems with the document by enacting
amendments, 10 but when Madison purported to make good on his promise by introducing a Bill of
Rights in the first Congress, many Antifederalists felt betrayed again. Madison’s Bill of Rights fell far
short of what the Antifederalists wanted and did nothing to cure what they viewed as the Constitution’s
most serious defects. 11
Surprisingly, despite of all this, and within a very short time, the new Constitution found wide
acceptance. Perhaps because the economy quickly recovered, 12 perhaps because the new Constitution

had been violated and were therefore no longer binding, see Akhil R. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amendment
the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988). For a rebuttal, see Bruce Ackerman & Neil Katyal,
Our Unconventional Founding, note 2 supra, at 539-557.
6
See Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, note 2 supra, at 517 (rushed election
violated Pennsylvania Constitution); 526 (Federalists “precipitated riots at polling places, allowing them to run off
with some ballot boxes).
7
For example, in Massachusetts, supporters of the Constitution falsely claimed that delegates would not be
paid unless they voted in favor of ratification. See WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION, note 2, supra, at 252. It is doubtful that the Constitution would have been ratified if Massachusetts
had voted “no,” and its “yes” vote was crucially influenced by Governor John Hancock’s endorsement. The
endorsement was apparently secured by the promise of leading Federalists to support his candidacy in the next
gubernatorial election. See PAULENE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, note 2, supra, at 192198.
8
For a discussion of the pressure put on Rhode Island to ratify the Constitution, see . See Bruce Ackerman
& Neil Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, note 2, supra, at 538-39.
9
See PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION note 2, supra, at 100 (recounting mob attack against opponents of
Constitution).
10
See ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791, at 171, 173 (1955).
11
For example, after Madison introduced his proposals, William Grayson, Virginia’s Antifederalist Senator,
wrote to Patrick Henry that it was “out of [his] power to hold out to you any flattering expectations on the score of
amendments.” 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS: 1789-1791, AT 759 (Charlene Bangs Bickford
et al., eds., 1992). After the amendments had been ratified by Congress, Grayson and Richard Lee, Virginia’s other
Senator, wrote to the Virginia General Assembly that the Amendments were “far short of the wishes of our
Country” and that Grayson and Lee had been unsuccessful in “bring[ing] to view the Amendments Proposed by our
Convention and approved by the Legislature.” 5 THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1186 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1980).
12
See MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF 14-15, 70 (1986) (noting attribution of improved
economic conditions to adoption of the Constitution).
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did little to obstruct what they wanted to accomplish, 13 its opponents gracefully accepted their defeat
and acceded to the binding force of a document they had recently and viciously attacked. 14
On conventional accounts, in the years since, the Constitution has served as the sacred text of
our civil religion. 15 People have fought passionately about what it means, but its authority and goodness
have served as common ground. It has come to symbolize the possibility of government limited by law
and the ability of an ethnically, politically, and culturally diverse populace to come together for the
common good. To oppose the Constitution is to oppose the American experiment itself, and to oppose
America is to be outside the realm of reasonable discourse. 16
And yet, through two centuries of hagiography for the founders and worship of the text that
they produced, atheists and agnostics have survived. Skeptics have continued to challenge the
goodness, enforceability, legitimacy, and workability of the Constitution. It is startling how deep this
counter-narrative runs. Skepticism even managed to worm its way into the Federalist Papers, which the
Supreme Court often treats as the Talmud of our constitutional Bible. 17 Since then and throughout our
history, many of our most revered political figures have expressed doubts about the Constitution.
Constitutional skepticism has been at the heart of some of our most important political battles, and it
has preoccupied some of our leading political thinkers. It is as American as apple pie.
The aim of this article is to recover and reevaluate the tradition of constitutional skepticism.
More is at stake here than merely complicating the historical record. The argument for the Constitution
itself hangs in the balance. In part this is true because, on the merits, the skeptics have a point. Perhaps
13

See id, at 72 (“By the mid-nineteenth century, the term ‘constitutional’ . . . had become a convenient
camouflage for moral compromise and political expediency.”)
14
See PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION, note 2, supra, at 432 (“After Congress declared the Constitution ratified
and called the first elections, the country rallied behind the new Constitution.”)
15
See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1984) (noting that the
Constitution has been “virtually from the moment of its ratification a sacred symbol”); SANFORD LEVINSON,
CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 11 (2011) (quoting Irving Kristol’s statement that the flag, the Constitution, and the
Declaration of Independence “constitute the holy trinity of what Tocqueville called the American ‘civil religion.’”)
16
See, e.g., id., at 252-54.
17
See pp xx-xx, infra.
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more significantly, however, a revival of the skeptical tradition makes it possible to talk seriously about
whether they have a point or not.
To see why this is so, we need to rehearse how the argument over skepticism has gone so far.
On the face of things, it seems bizarre to bind ourselves to a very old and difficult-to-amend text, full of
idiosyncrasies, and written by people who had no inkling of the economic, political, material, and moral
climate of twenty-first century America. 18 Paradoxically, constitutional obedience violates the first
three words of the Constitution itself. Instead of empowering “We the [living] People,” it empowers
They the dead People.
Despite these obvious problems with constitutional obedience, modern skeptics rarely get
anything like a full hearing. To the extent that anyone pays attention to them at all, they are considered
cranks, too far outside the mainstream to take seriously. This reaction is more of a predisposition than
anything resembling a refuting argument, but a few defenders of constitutionalism have turned the
predisposition into an argument. They insist that the long tradition of past respect for the Constitution
counts as a reason for present respect. On this view, and despite what Jefferson claimed, 19 prior
generations are not like a foreign country exercising imperialist power over the present. On the
contrary, they are a (concededly constructed) part of “us” because political identity, like personal
identity, makes sense only diachronically. There is a continuing, coherent constitutional narrative that
extends backward to the moment of founding. “We the people” includes people living and dead
because living peoples are necessarily formed by practices, institutions, and habits of thought inherited

18

(2013).
19

I make an extended argument for this proposition in LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE
See “Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, September 6, 1789, with Copies and Fragment,” in VI THE WORKS

OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 3 (Paul Leicester Ford, ed., 1904) (“by the law of nature, one generation is to another as one

independent nation is to another.”)
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from past generations. It is just this inheritance that defines a People, gives it autonomy, and separates
it from other Peoples. 20
If our constitutional tradition forms the backbone of our national identity and gives meaning to
our collective existence over time, then insisting that we give up on it is asking quite a lot. But need we
conceive of constitutionalism this way? The starting point for this article is that there is usually a choice
about how we construct our past. The choice is not boundless, or at least it is not boundless given
contingent cultural constraints on our imagination at any particular moment. It is hard for us presently
to imagine our history as defined by, say, the gradual emergence of a Confucian social order immanent
in founding choices. But even if constrained, there is more freedom than we often realize. 21
Constitutional skepticism offers an alternative way to construct our history – a construction that
is also consistent with the historical data and within the possibilities of imagination, or at least so I
argue. This article is intended as a first stab at fostering this reimagination. To be clear, I make no claim
that this narrative is the only way to make sense of our past. My project is “constructivist” in the sense
that it chooses one of many interpretations so as to make the best of our history. 22 Of course,
reasonable people will disagree with my normative assessment of which interpretation makes that
history the “best.” My aim is to lay the groundwork for just such a discussion – a discussion that cannot
take place so long as the prevailing narrative of constitution-worship is the only one available. What
follows, therefore, is not so much an argument for constitutional skepticism as a necessary
prolegomenon to such an argument.
Part I consists of a brief history of skepticism running from before the founding to the modern
period. My aim here is not to provide anything like a complete description of the historical actors, texts,
20

For the best articulation of this view, see generally JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001).
21
See generally BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM
(1991).
22
In this sense, but perhaps only in this sense, my project parallels Ronald Dworkin’s famous effort to
provide a constructivist account of law. See generally R.M. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
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and events that I discuss. Instead, I link together familiar episodes and arguments that stretch across
our history so as to demonstrate that they are part of a common narrative that has been crucial to our
self-identity.
A fair objection to this enterprise is that I have lumped together a variety of arguments that are
in fact separate and unrelated. Part II responds to this worry by disentangling the various strands of
skeptical argument. People who have had doubts about the Constitution have not always shared the
same doubts. Some skeptics have argued that the Constitution produces evil outcomes and ought to be
resisted to the extent that it is evil. A related, but analytically distinct claim is that the Constitution
binds us to the “dead hand” of the past and, so, is fundamentally undemocratic. Other critics have
focused on the means of constitutional enforcement. They have claimed that judicial review is deeply
undemocratic and inconsistent with rule by “We the People.” Still other critics have made something
like the opposite point – that the Constitution cannot be enforced and constitutes no more than
“parchment barriers.”
There is at best a complex relationship between these claims. Perhaps they even contradict
each other. Moreover, there is a similarly complex relationship between the various strands of
constitutional skepticism and a more global skepticism about law and about morals. Despite this
complexity, the argument of Part II is that the various strands of constitutional skepticism share a
common core. At base, all forms of constitutional skepticism rest on doubts about whether moral and
political disagreement can be bridged by a legal text. Those doubts, in turn, are grounded on a rejection
of global moral skepticism and on deep strands of American thought that emphasize the possibility of
moral knowledge.
In Part III, I very briefly suggest some preliminary conclusions about how we should view
constitutional skepticism. I argue that there are reasons to think that a dose constitutional skepticism
might mitigate some of our current political dysfunction.
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I conclude with the suggestion that the mere recognition of the possibility of constitutional
skepticism undermines one of the main arguments against it.
I. A Brief History of Constitutional Skepticism
As I hope to demonstrate in the Part that follows, the United States enjoys a rich tradition of
thought and action grounded in skepticism about constitutionalism in general, about the worth of the
American Constitution in particular, and about modes by which the American constitution might be
interpreted and enforced. Before exploring this tradition, however, I must emphasize several limitations
of my project.
First, my aim is not to provide a comprehensive account of this tradition. I have tried to be
accurate and to avoid over simplification, but a comprehensive account would require book length
treatments of every topic that I cover below. Instead, my goal is to link together a group of disparate
individuals and episodes so as to tell a coherent story about our national ethos. Accordingly, I have
emphasized those thinkers and events that evince common themes useful for the organization of
skeptical thought.
Second, the tradition that I describe, while vibrant and important, has also often been
subterranean. Because it undermines the official narrative, it sometimes finds expression in things said
softly or indirectly or in things left entirely unsaid. Only occasionally, but at nonetheless dramatic and
important historical moments does it receive full-throated endorsement. More usually, one has to read
texts and events carefully, but, I hope, not tendentiously, to find a submerged message.
Third, I make little effort in the pages that follow to recount popular attitudes toward the
Constitution. 23 This failure is only partially attributable to my lack of the methodological skills necessary
to accomplish this task. For better or worse, unifying national myths and narratives tend to be formed
by recollection of great episodes in our history and of the great men and women who made them.
23

For the leading effort to do so, see MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN
AMERICAN CULTURE (1987).
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Because I am interested in reconstructing a national narrative, I have concentrated my attention on the
sorts of people and events that have formed it.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing again the constructivist nature of this project. The skeptical
narrative that I relate is one of many that can be made to fit the historical data. The data can
demonstrate that this narrative possibility exists, but cannot alone dictate the choice between
narratives.
A. Constitutional Skepticism before the Constitution
Even before there was a Constitution, there was constitutional skepticism. The preRevolutionary period was marked by the growth and vibrancy of constitutional theory. Spurred by the
emergence of enlightenment rationality and the decline in the legitimacy of divine rights monarchs,
political thinkers such as Locke, Grotius, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, Vattel, and Rutherford developed the
idea of a system of natural rights that would define and limit government power. 24 The fundamental
and powerful idea was that people could formulate a set of basic principles that would serve to regulate
and control ordinary politics and, so, legitimate and limit the exercise of coercive government power. In
colonial America, these ideas were given concrete instantiation with the writing of corporate charters
creating the various colonies 25 – charters that eventually morphed into state constitutions. 26
It was natural that when tensions emerged between colonial America and England, Americans
expressed their dissatisfaction in constitutional terms. Although they did not rely on a written
constitution, they insisted that the “rights of Englishmen” trumped ordinary positive law and that

24

See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American
Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 , 860-65 (1978).
25
See generally MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL CULTURE AND THE EMPIRE
(2004)
26
For a discussion, see LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES 50-55 (2004). For a brief history of the
development of state constitutions, see “Editors Introduction” in ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JOHN JAY & JAMES MADISON,
THE FEDERALIST XXIII-XXXI (The Gideon Edition, George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001).
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neither Parliament nor the King had unlimited power over them. 27 Even before independence was
achieved, the first impulse of the colonial states was to reduce to writing their understandings of how
government would function. The result was the Articles of Confederation. Around the same time, there
was a flurry of constitution writing at the state level.
1. Hobbes. At the very moment when constitutional creativity was in full bloom, though,
various strands of skepticism emerged, each of which finds voice even today. Much of the skepticism
has its roots in social contract theory itself. At least conventionally, the theory begins with Thomas
Hobbes’ famous description of an anarchic and brutal state of nature. 28 In the Hobbesian tradition, even
the strong have an interest in coming to an agreement on a government that would control otherwise
unconstrained violence. 29 But, importantly, Hobbes did not believe that the social contract provided
many important limits on government power. On the contrary, he thought that a government powerful
enough to constrain violence would have to be powerful enough to control the lives of its citizens. 30 On
the Hobbesian account, the trade was worth it so as to avoid the nightmare of universal depredation.
The Hobbesian account supports a familiar argument in favor of constitutionalism. If the
Constitution is treated as an instantiation of the social contract, then the commonly expressed fear that
27

See generally Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American
Revolutionary Thought, note 24, supra.
28
In a well-known passage, Hobbes wrote that in a state of nature
there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture
of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no
commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing, such things as require much
force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society;
and, which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man,
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: OR THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER OF A COMMONWEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVIl 100 (Michael
Oakeshott ed., 1962).
29
See Murray Forsyth, “Hobbes’ Contractarianism: A Comparative Analysis, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT FROM
HOBBES TO RAWLS (David Boucher & Paul Kelly eds, 1994) at 39 (on Hobbes theory, state necessary to meet people’s
practical earthly needs).
30
See id., at 41 (Hobbes’ state granted full autonomy); Mark Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent
Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. ,. REV. 1502, 1504 (1985) (although rulers would use their power for selfish
purposes life with the Leviathan would still be better than life without it).
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society would devolve into chaos if constitutional obligation eroded has clear Hobbesian roots. But
Hobbes’ analysis also undermines a key part of the standard story. An essential element of the ideology
of constitutionalism is that constitutions constrain government power and, so, prevent not only chaos
but also tyranny. 31 Hobbes forces us to ask skeptical questions about whether and how constitutions
can serve this function. How, exactly, will words on a piece of paper stop self-interested rulers vested
with the power necessary to prevent a war of all against all from turning into tyrants?
This worry runs throughout the skeptical tradition, finding expression, for example, in
Madison’s 32 and Hamilton’s 33 belittling of “parchment barriers,” in Holmes insistence that judges should
not try to use the Constitution to obstruct “the natural outcome of a dominant opinion,” 34 in Learned
Hand’s warning that the Constitution could not be expected to safeguard liberty, 35 and in the work of
modern scholars like Daryl Levinson 36 who doubts that respect for constitutional law meaningfully
constrains government actors, and Adrian Vermeule 37 who explores “second best” constitutionalism
that actors must adopt when other actors fail to follow constitutional norms.
2. Locke. John Locke’s version of social contract theory was more optimistic. For Locke, people
in a state of nature live in freedom and independence 38 and resolve their disputes by resort to reason. 39

31

See, e.g., Gordon Schochet, “Introduction: Constitutionalism, Liberalism, and the Study of Politics” in
CONSTITUTIONALISM (J. RONALD PENNOCK & JOHN H CHAPMAN, EDS. 1979) AT XX (fundamental principle uniting all theories
of constitutionalism is that “governments exist only for specified ends and properly function only according to
specified rules”.)
32
See The Federalist No. 48 (Madison) in THE FEDERALIST: THE GIDEON EDITION (GEORGE W. CAREY & JAMES
MCCELLAN, EDS. 2001) at 256 (arguing against trust in “parchment barriers.”)
33
See “The Federalist No. 73” (Hamilton) in THE FEDERALIST: THE GIDEON EDITION, note 32, supra, at 380
(insufficiency of “a mere parchment delineation.”)
34
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
35
Learned Hand, “The Spirit of Liberty” in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 190-91 (3d ed., 1960) (“Liberty lies in the
hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it.”)
36
See Daryl Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV.
L. REV . 657 (2011).
37
See Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003).
38
See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 189 (1821) (in state of nature, all men are in “a state of
perfect freedom to order their action and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the
bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.”) (emphasis in
original).
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However, the obligation we owe to God, to each other, and to ourselves to preserve mankind cannot be
fully met in the absence of civil authority. When individuals join society, they consent to give up some
of their rights so as to ensure meaningful enforcement of other rights. 40
Unlike the Hobbesian account, the Lockean social contract has strong limits. Whereas Hobbes
saw government as no more than a means of establishing earthly peace, for Locke it was superimposed
on the kingdom of God that already existed in the state of nature. Whereas Hobbes therefore treated
the political order as essentially omnipotent, Locke thought that government power was conditional. It
is premised on the continuing consent of the governed, 41 and when the state no longer protects the
rights it was intended to preserve, the consent is vitiated. 42 When governments violate those rights, its
citizens have the right to take up arms. 43
There can be no doubt that Locke’s constitutional contractualism influenced the framing of the
American constitution, but the implications it held for future constitutional obligation are more
ambiguous. Locke, himself, was doubtful that law could or should entirely constrain executive power.
He recognized an executive prerogative to act in violation of the law when necessary to deal with
unanticipated events or pressing necessities. 44 No doubt, he thought that these circumstances were
exceptional, but this leaves open the famous problem of who gets to define the exception and whether,
once this power of definition is granted, the power can be constrained. 45

39

See id, at 191 (reason is law of nature).
Id., at 259-62.
41
Id. at 287 (“It is plain mankind never owned nor considered any . . . natural subjection that they were born
in, to one or the other that tied them, without their own consent to a subjection of them and their heirs.”)
(emphasis in original).
42
Id, at 299 (“The power of the society . . . can never be supposed to extend further than the common
good.”) (emphasis in original).
43
See id., at 322 (“in all state and conditions, the true remedy of force without authority is to oppose force
to it. The use of force without authority always puts him that uses it into a state of war, as the aggressor, and
renders him liable to be treated accordingly.”) (emphasis in original).
44
See id., at 322-323.
45
The seminal work is CARL SCHMITT, DICTATORSHIP (English ed. 2014).
40
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The problem is not merely theoretical. It has taken concrete form throughout American history.
As we shall see, many American Presidents have asserted a power to transcend normal constitutional
limits when there are strong pragmatic reasons to do so. 46 Of course, these Presidents often (but
importantly not always) attempted to reconcile these powers with the Constitution by reading
emergency powers into the document. But this reconciliation comes with a necessary price: it weakens
the claim that constitutions meaningfully constrain executive discretion and so, feeds back into
Hobbesian skepticism.
Even putting aside the problem of the executive prerogative, Locke’s theory has the potential to
destabilize existing constitutions. Because the theory rests on a consent that could always be
withdrawn and on the potential gap between government that actually exists and the ends of God, 47 it
provides more obvious support for revolution than for constitutional obedience. 48 It is therefore no
surprise that Locke is more extensively paraphrased in the Declaration of Independence than in the
Constitution.
Moreover, the most obvious connection between Lockean theory and the Constitution’s framing
history actually undermines constitutional obligation. At the beginning of the Philadelphia convention,
the framers were faced with the embarrassment that the congressional resolution authorizing the
proceedings had permitted them to meet for “the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of
Confederation.” 49 Worse yet, the Articles themselves required that amendments be adopted
unanimously by all thirteen state legislatures. 50 Yet in the earliest days of the convention, the framers
46

See pp xx, infra.
See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT note 37, supra, at 305 (“The rules that [legislators] make for
other men’s actions must . . . conform to the law of nature, i.e., to the will of God of which that is a declaration and
the fundamental law of nature being the preservation of mankind, no human sanction can be good or valid against
it”) (emphasis in original).
48
See note 43, supra.
49
See I JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787 at 120 (2d ed., 1836) [Hereinafter
cited as DEBATES)
50
See note 5, supra.
47
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determined to scrap the Articles entirely. By the end of the convention, they had decided that the new
constitution would be deemed ratified when adopted by state conventions (not state legislatures) in
only nine of the thirteen states.
The framers’ justification for this blatant constitutional violation was drawn directly from
Locke. 51 For example, at the convention, Roger Sherman objected to the proposed form of ratification
on the ground that “the Articles of Confederation [provided] for changes and alternations with the
assent of Congress and the ratification of State legislatures.” 52 George Mason responded that
constitutions “are derived from the people. This doctrine should be cherished as the basis of free
government.” 53 James Wilson later made a similar point when defending the Constitution before the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention: because government rest on popular consent, “[t]he people have a
right . . . to form . . . a general government. . . . This is the broad base on which our independence was
placed. On the same certain and solid foundation [the new constitution] is erected.” 54
It is dangerous for defenders of constitutional obligation to traffic in this argument. Two
destabilizing possibilities are immediately apparent. First, whereas the Hobbesian social contract was
justified solely on the ground that it avoided chaos, the Lockean contract was meant to protect other
goods. It follows from this Lockean premise, that preservation of social order alone might be insufficient
to justify constitutional obedience. There might be a gap between any particular constitution and the
aims that legitimate it, and this gap might warrant departure from constitutional obligation. Thus,
because the Articles of Confederation were no longer serving the ends it was written to achieve, the
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Framers felt justified in ignoring them. 55 But the very argument the Framers used to support their new
constitution might also be advanced to defy it 56, as indeed both southern secessionists and northern
abolitionists did during the run up to the Civil War. 57
Second, arguments from popular consent raise difficulties about how the consent is manifested
and how we know when it is withdrawn. If the actual American Constitution is conceptualized as the
social contract, then there are obvious problems with its democratic pedigree. No women or people of
color and few people without property voted for it. 58 And the problem runs deeper than this. David
Hume, Locke’s contemporary who probably influenced the framers more than Locke himself, rejected
social contract theory in part on the ground that even a contract consented to by contemporaries could
not bind future generations. 59
On one interpretation, Locke’s social contract was an actual historical agreement that brought
governments into being. Hume was almost certainly right in rejecting this version of the theory, not just
because of the inter-generational problem, but also because it is an inaccurate account of how
governments actually arise. 60 Locke’s position might be rescued from Humean skepticism if the contract
55
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is conceptualized instead as a thought experiment. Perhaps the contract is what reasonable people
would agree to in a state of nature. But this merely hypothetical consent hardly constitutes the sort of
robust justification provided by actual consent from “We the People.” 61 Moreover, this version of the
theory again opens up the possibility of a dangerous gap between a hypothetical social contract and any
actual, real-world constitution. If it is the hypothetical contract that provides legitimacy, then any real
constitution that departs from this contract is illegitimate. And matters are made only worse by the fact
that in a diverse society, even people who believe in social contract theory are bound to disagree among
themselves about what terms must be included in the contract.
3. The contestable constitution. These difficulties in grounding contemporary ideas about
constitutionalism in Locke go some way toward explaining what otherwise seems paradoxical about how
eighteenth century Americans thought about constitutional law. On the one hand, they took
constitutionalism and constitutional violation very seriously. Rhetoric of the period is full of
constitutional claims and assertions of constitutional rights. 62 Yet on the other hand, Americans seemed

It is probable, that the first ascendant of one man over multitudes began during a state of war; where the
superiority of courage and of genius discovers itself most visibly. . . The long continuance of that state, an
incident common among savage tribes, enured the people to submission; and if the chieftain possessed as
much equity as prudence and valour, be became, even during peace, the arbiter of all differences, and
could gradually, by a mixture of force and consent, establish his authority.
Id. at 22.
But in another essay, he writes that
When we consider how nearly equal all men are in their bodily force, and even in their mental powers and
faculties, till cultivated by education; we must necessarily allow, that nothing but their own consent could,
at first, associate them together and subject them to any authority. . . . If this, then, be meant by the
original contract, it cannot be denied, that all government is, at first, founded on a contract, and that the
most ancient rude combinations of mankind were formed entirely by that principle.
Id., at 187-88.
61
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quite content with a system that lacked a clear means of constitutional enforcement or authoritative
resolution of constitutional controversy. As Larry Kramer summarizes the prevailing zeitgeist:
[The] constitutional system . . . was self-consciously legal in nature, but in a manner foreign to
modern sensibilities about the makeup of legality. . . . Eighteenth-century constitutionalism was
less concerned with quick, clear resolutions. Its notion of legality was less rigid and more diffuse
– more willing to tolerate ongoing controversy over competing plausible interpretations of the
constitution, more willing to ascribe authority to an idea as unfocused as “the people.” 63
No American thinker better embodied this conception of constitutionalism than Thomas Paine.
Paine famously claimed that “In America, the law is king,” 64 and there can be no doubt that he thought
that the Constitution was the law. 65 Yet Paine also believed in unfettered representative democracy.
He followed Hume 66 and foreshadowed Jefferson 67 in insisting on the fundamental illegitimacy of one
generation binding another. 68 How can these positions be reconciled?
Paine’s work is maddeningly vague, 69 but on at least one understanding, it takes the
destabilizing potential of Lockean theory very seriously. On this view, the Constitution is, indeed, law,
but it maintains that status only so long as it has the active consent of the people. This means that the
Constitution is always revisable and subject to continual contestation. Ultimately, it is guardian of,
rather than the enemy of, full throated representative democracy.
This is constitutionalism of a sort, but it is a constitutionalism at war with the standard story as
we have come to understand it. Paine’s constitution provided neither settlement nor hierarchical
63
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ordering. It was a site for contestation and civic engagement, not a means of permanently resolving
disputes and defusing destabilizing controversy.
As foreign as it may seem to us today, this view of constitutionalism seems to have been quite
common in the late eighteenth century. For example, state constitutions were often adopted by
ordinary legislative means, 70 and some leading authorities believed that they could be repealed by
statute. 71 Constitutional enforcement was not the job of politicians or judges, but of the people
themselves. Popular enforcement, in turn, was facilitated by the very short terms of office for
legislatures, narrow jurisdiction for courts, and truncated powers for executives. 72
Eighteenth century Americans were able to conceptualize constitutionalism in this way because
they lived in an era of constitutional creation, rather than constitutional obedience. The act of creating
a constitution is exhilarating and liberating. It is an assertion of generational autonomy. As John
Adams observed,
How few of the human race have ever enjoyed an opportunity of making an election of
government, more than of air, soil, or climate, for themselves or their children! When, before
the present epocha, had three millions of people full power and a fair opportunity to form and
establish the wisest and happiest government that human wisdom can contrive. 73
So long as Americans were creating constitutions for themselves, there was no contradiction
between constitutionalism on the one hand and popular sovereignty on the other. But a problem arises
when, as Adams mentions, constitutional creators began writing not just for themselves but also for
their children. When constitutional aspirations have congealed into a text and been immunized from
easy revision, the struggle for generational autonomy begins to seem like a zero sum game. Autonomy
for one generation is gained at the expense of subservience of another, and constitutionalism becomes
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an exercise in domination as well as liberation. The efforts by the founding generation to deal with this
problem gave to rise to a new justificatory story, as well as new varieties of skepticism.
B. Skepticism at the Founding
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, American constitutionalism was founded on a
contradiction. Late eighteenth century America was a revolutionary state. When the Framers met in
Philadelphia, memories of the uprising against British rule were still fresh. Importantly, and despite the
colonists’ assertion of the “rights of Englishmen,” that uprising was illegal under then-existing law. It
therefore had to be justified by theories that rejected the binding force of that law -- theories like the
one outlined in the Declaration of Independence. 74 These theories did not magically disappear with the
victory at Yorktown. A generation formed by rebellion against British authority was not about to accept
meekly the claims of new rulers. Hence, the free-form, populist, nonauthoritarian constitutionalism that
dominated America’s early years.
But the country needed stability to grow and thrive. It therefore could not avoid the dilemma
faced by all revolutionary states: How does one establish that the revolution is over? How can law and
order be reestablished once it has been disrupted? 75 Ruling elites somehow had to make clear that
rebellion against the British was one thing, but rebellion against the new status quo – Shays’ Rebellion,
for example – was another thing altogether. The country had to find a way to suppress,
compartmentalize, or rationalize the illegality of its own birth in order to establish the new legality.
On conventional accounts, the drafting and ratification of the Constitution resolved this
contradiction. Popular ratification put an end to the fluidity and destabilization of revolutionary
constitutionalism and legitimated rigid rules that established fixed boundaries between different
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branches, governments, and spheres. Writing within a decade of ratification, Justice James Iredell
explained how text congealed the law and put an end to disputation:
It has been the policy of all the American states, . . . and of the people of the United States, . . .
to define with precision the objects of the legislative power, and to restrain its exercise within
marked and settled boundaries. If any act of congress or of the legislature of a state, violates
those constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably void. . . . If, on the other hand, the
legislature of the Union or the legislature of any member of the Union, shall pass a law within
the general scope of their constitutional power, the court cannot pronounce it to be void,
merely because it is, in their judgment contrary to the principles of natural justice. 76
No doubt, some of the Constitution’s framers hoped that constitutional text would produce this
sort of certainty and stabilization. Their success in accomplishing this goal is less clear. In fact, the effort
to fix constitutional discourse had something like the opposite effect. For all its imprecision and
destabilizing potential, pre-ratification constitutionalism reconciled the demands of popular sovereignty
and constitutional law. When the Constitution was stabilized by a legal text and immunized from easy
revision, this reconciliation unraveled. The result was the emergence of a variety of worries, critiques,
and contradictions that remain with us today. This Section examines the way in which these problems
influenced the debate over ratification, the adoption of the Bill of Rights, and the thought of Thomas
Jefferson.
1. The Antifederalists. The Antifederalist campaign was the most sustained and unambiguous
attack on the American Constitution in our history. As the political scientist Herbert Storing
meticulously demonstrated, 77 it was also one of the great lost causes in American history. Leaders of
the campaign created a huge volume of argument and theory, some of which deserves to be ranked
among the classics of political thought. 78 And the campaign almost succeeded. 79
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It is no surprise, then, that the Antifederalist campaign produced a treasure trove of argument
against the Constitution – argument that still resonates some two centuries later. The Antifederalist
distrust of the federal power, celebration of localism and decentralization, worry about militarization
and high taxes, and fear of a remote political class 80 all play an important role in modern American
politics. 81
But although Antifederalist writing provides a sustained critique of the Constitution, most of it
was not explicitly directed against constitutional obligation per se. If anything, Antifederalists
complained that the Constitution was insufficiently binding – that its vague and sweeping language
constituted an open invitation to the federal government to seize vast swaths of power. 82 Ironically,
though, if one looks carefully beneath the surface, these complaints not only undermine the particular
constitution written in Philadelphia but also raise important skeptical questions about the constitutional
enterprise itself.
First, Antifederalists complained repeatedly and vociferously about the problem of
constitutional origin. 83 As discussed above, the constitutional convention ignored the legal
requirements imposed by the Articles of Confederation. 84 The problems of fairness and legality grew
only more serious as the ratification process proceeded. Individual state conventions were marred by
serious irregularities, efforts to short-circuit or terminate debate and deliberation, and, in a few cases,
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violent intimidation. After a critical mass of states had voted to ratify the Constitution, the holdouts
were threatened with economic retaliation and collapse if they did not go along. 85
Of course, the Constitution’s opponents focused on the particular problems with the measure
they opposed, but the origins problem they identified is generalizable. All constitutions break with the
legal past, and all of them therefore raise questions about their own legal legitimacy. 86 In our own case,
throughout American history, the original sin of the framers has destabilized the myth of immaculate
conception. As Bruce Ackerman has forcefully argued, there is no reason to suppose that only one
generation had the wisdom and intelligence to engage in the task of constitutional invention. 87 The
ratification process therefore raised deeply destabilizing questions about whether we should emulate
the Framers’ own example of disobedience to others, or slavishly follow their hypocritical insistence on
obedience to them.
The substantive complaints of the Antifederalists feed a second, more general constitutional
skepticism. It is a mistake, made too often in modern scholarship, to reduce the fight over the
Constitution to a simple ideological clash. There were many cross-cutting interests – some of them
quite narrow and ugly – that influenced the positions people on both sides took on ratification. Still, the
most basic objection to the new Constitution – that it expanded federal power at the expense of local
politics– had a clear ideological valence.
In the late eighteenth century, American government was remarkably responsive to the views of
the electorate. The federal government was very weak, and most power was exercised on the state
level. State legislators, in turn, served very short terms, and, by modern standards, executives and
85
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courts were relatively powerless. 88 These arrangements were justified by belief in republican
governance and the sort of free-form constitutionalism described above. On this view, politics was
something more than a spectator sport. Direct and regular involvement in the institutions of
government built civic virtue and contributed to the good life. 89
There can be no doubt that one of the aims of the Constitutional Convention was to change this
state of affairs. On the specific level, the Constitution’s framers and supporters were deeply frightened
by the threats to property and contract posed by state governments. On the more general level, they
disparaged direct popular rule and believed that democracy led inevitably to faction and denial of
minority rights. 90
In one sense, this argument was not so much about constitutionalism as about the kind of
constitution the United States should have.

As noted above, most Antifederalists did not think of

themselves as opposed to constitutional governance. They opposed only the Philadelphia Constitution
precisely because it provided insufficient constitutional guarantees for local, popular democracy.
But in a paradoxical and deeper sense, the Antifederalist critique of the Philadelphia Constitution
meshed seamlessly with a complaint about constitutionalism in general. Because all formal and written
constitutions channel politics and constrain the range of possible outcomes, they are all enemies of the
sort of freeform, participatory democracy that some Antifederalists favored. If one truly believes in
republican deliberation – in the ability of the people to transcend their differences and engage in selfrule – then fixed constitutional commands that predetermine outcomes and control politics are an evil.
It is not accident, then, that the Constitution’s defenders doubted the ability of average citizens
to engage in direct deliberation and that its opponents feared that its ratification would presage a return
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to aristocratic governance. Nor is it a coincidence that James Madison, the Constitution’s principal
author, opposed easy constitutional revision and thought that constitutional creation should be limited
to “great and extraordinary occasions,” 91 while Thomas Jefferson, a supporter of the Constitution who
was nonetheless much more sympathetic to Antifederalist thought, believed that constitutions should
last for only a generation. 92
Finally, Antifederalist opposition inevitably raised vexing questions of constitutional authority.
If, as the Antifederalists insisted, the new Constitution was not only illegal but also substantively evil,
why should anyone feel obligated to obey its commands? Put differently, if there is a gap between the
Constitution and the demands of substantive justice, why should we give precedence to the
Constitution? Remarkably, this question seems to have remained mostly unasked in the period
immediately following ratification. 93 As we shall see, however, the question reemerged with a
vengeance as various factions seized upon the Constitution to advance arguments and causes strongly
opposed by others.
2. The Federalists. The Federalists supported the new Constitution and, of course, by extension,
constitutionalism as well. Their writing therefore seems an unlikely place to look for constitutional
skepticism, and indeed the tracts they produced contained detailed defenses of the new Constitution.
Once again, though, another, competing story emerges if one looks beneath the surface. For example,
on careful reading, The Federalist Papers, doubtless the most sophisticated defense of the Constitution,
contain important seeds of constitutional doubt.
This doubt finds its clearest expression in Madison’s and Hamilton’s dismissal of what they
called “parchment barriers.” 94 Hamilton justified the refusal of the framers to provide for a bill of rights
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partially on the ground that mere textual guarantees were worthless. 95 In a letter to Jefferson during
the ratification struggle, Madison seemed to agree. Experience with state constitutions demonstrated
that “repeated violations of these parchment barriers have been committed by overbearing
majorities.” 96
In the Federalist Papers, Madison extended this argument and made it central to his defense of
the Constitution more generally. Because men were not angels, he insisted, they were unlikely to
respect limits on their power simply because of legal commands. Instead, these limits had to be
bolstered by self-interest. This could be achieved, Madison insisted, by setting ambition against
ambition and building conflict between self-interested actors into the structure of government. 97
This classic argument in favor of the American Constitution also serves as the starting point for a
skeptical critique. The argument suggests that constitutions are either ineffective or unnecessary.
Government officials who are public spirited enough to obey constitutional commands will also be
public spirited enough not to use their power to oppress others. In a world where men are angels,
constitutions are unnecessary. The source of concern is about government officials who are not angels
and who will be tempted to misuse their power. But officials of this sort will also be tempted to disobey
constitutional commands. They will not be restrained by mere “parchment barriers,” and, so, for them,
the constitution will be ineffective. 98

95

Hamilton made the point with reference to the failure of the Constitution to protect liberty of the press:
What is the liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition which would not leave the utmost latitude
for evasion? I hold that be impracticable; and from this I infer, that its security, whatever fine declarations
may be inserted in any constitution respecting it, must altogether depend on public opinion, and on the
general spirit of the people and of the government. And here, after all, as intimated upon another
occasion, must we seek for the only sold basis of our rights.”

Federalist No. 84 in THE FEDERALIST, note 32, supra, at 446.
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295,
297-99 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1977).
97
Federalist No. 51, in THE FEDERALIST note 32, supra, at 267-272.
98
See generally, Daryl Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment,
124 HARV. L. REV . 657 (2011).
96

26
In Federalist 78, Hamilton argued that this problem might be remedied by an independent
judiciary with authority to invalidate unconstitutional acts. 99 The argument is the source of an enduring
puzzle. The judiciary had to be independent, Hamilton argued, if it was to resist pressure from the other
branches of government and from the public to trample on constitutional rights. 100 But unless we are to
suppose that judges are angels, this very independence meant that these judges would be free to defy
rather than enforce the Constitution. As an anonymous Antifederalist using the pseudonym Brutus
wrote, a powerful judiciary lodged power “in the hands of men independent of the people, and of their
representatives, . . . [with] no way . . . left to controul them.” 101
Hamilton’s response to this worry was to point out that a judiciary with “no influence over the
sword or the purse” and possessed of “neither FORCE nor WILL,” was “the least dangerous branch.” 102
But at best this observation demonstrates only that judges acting alone would not themselves threaten
liberty. It does not explain why they might not form a coalition with another branch to do so, how they
could enforce the Constitution when they had neither force nor will, or what motive they would have to
attempt such enforcement.
Madison’s effort to deal with the problem of enforcement was at once more sophisticated and
more skeptical. 103 Instead of trusting any particular institution or group of people to act in a public
spirited fashion, he argued for structural protections. The Constitution’s byzantine system of
overlapping and conflicting powers provided built-in mechanisms to discipline official misconduct. On
his view, officials responsible to different constituencies and elected at different times will have
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different interests. These interests will inevitably conflict with each other and provide an incentive for
different branches of government to check each other. In this fashion, “the private interest of every
individual [would] be the sentinel over the public rights” 104 and the Constitution would become selfenforcing.
Madison’s theory has been strongly criticized on a variety of grounds, but for our purposes, the
important point is that it is in serious tension with the usual arguments for constitutionalism. First,
notice that the theory says nothing about direct constitutional protection for individual rights, about
judicial review, or about the enforcement of the legal minutiae contained in all constitutions. Madison’s
point is that the broad structures of the American Constitution will protect public rights, not that
enforcement of specific commands is either possible or necessary. Put differently, his argument has
nothing to do with, for example, the constitutionalization of issues about affirmative action, gay rights,
abortion, or racial discrimination. Nor does it speak to enforcement of specific constitutional
commands about questions like when the President’s term of office begins or what the line of
succession should be in the case of presidential death or incapacity. In short, it has nothing to do with
the principal role that the Constitution plays in contemporary American life.
Of course, modern constitutional issues occasionally arise about the general structure of
government. But here, too, Madison’s argument is at best ambivalent about the role of constitutional
text. A common modern argument for constitutional obedience rest on the value of stability and
predictability. 105 But Madison argued for a fluid, ill-defined government structure that would invite
contestation between the branches and, so, counteract ambition with ambition. 106
Finally, Madison never successfully resolved the “parchment barriers” problem. This phrase first
appears in Federalist 48, which starts with the observation that “powers properly belonging to one of
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the departments ought not be directly and completely administered by either of the other
departments.” 107 Madison then turns to the question of how to enforce this requirement. Recall that
James Iredell, reflecting the standard defense of constitutionalism a decade later, claimed that the
Constitution “define[d] with precision the objects of the legislative power, and [restrained] its exercise
within marked and settled boundaries.” 108 Remarkably, Madison used almost identical language to
reject this ambition. “Will it be sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries of these departments,
in the constitution of the government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the encroaching
spirit of power?” 109 he asked. His response was a resounding “no.” “This is the security which appears
to have been principally relied on by the compilers of most of the American constitutions. But
experience assures us, that the efficacy of the provision has been greatly overrated.” 110
Madison then proceeded to provide numerous contemporary examples of the failure of
constitutional law to constrain the evils he identifies. The next several Papers address other inadequate
mechanisms of enforcement, including constitutional amendment and popular democracy. 111 Finally, in
Federalist 51, he asked the question again and purported to provide an answer:
To what expedient then shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary
partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the constitution? The only
answer that can be given is, that as all the exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the
defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government, as that its
several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in
their proper place. 112
This “answer” is more than a little puzzling. Madison started out by saying that the new
government with its structure of overlapping powers will protect liberty and the public interest. He
recognized that these good outcomes were dependent upon this structure remaining intact and asked
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how the structural rules could be enforced. But his answer leads to a circle: The structural provisions, he
says, will be enforced by the structural provisions.
The failure of this answer, offered by the most sophisticated constitutional thinker of his
generation, is itself evidence in favor of constitutional skepticism. It points to the unavoidable fact that
ultimately constitutional limits depend for their efficacy on the willingness of powerful, self -interested
actors to exercise restraint. The doubt that they will do so remains with us still.
But even if we focus on the parts of Madison’s argument that were more successful, his writings
provide powerful arguments against conventional constitutionalism. It is worth emphasizing that
Madison was deeply skeptical of text as a source of constraint, believed in fostering conflicts between
the branches of government rather than using the Constitution to demarcate clear limits, and, at least at
the time of the framing, thought that direct constitutional protection for civil liberties was unnecessary
and unwise. 113
Some historians have overestimated the influence of the Federalist Papers on contemporary
debate. There is no reason to believe that they reflected views of most Americans or even of most of
the Constitution’s drafters. 114 Madison and his co-authors are more important because of how they are
viewed today than because of their influence at the time of the framing. For better or worse, the
Federalist Papers have become a central part of our constitutional narrative. For purposes of this
project, it matters that they are part of our counter-narrative as well.
3. The Bill of Rights.

On conventional accounts, the most important, defining attribute of

American constitutionalism is the textual protection and judicial enforcement of individual rights.
According to these accounts, the American Bill of Rights is widely admired and copied throughout the
world and symbolizes limited government and individual freedom. It is central to the story that
constitutionalists tell about the American experiment.
113
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There are many reasons to doubt these accounts. In fact, many modern constitutions depart
substantially from the American Bill of Rights model, in particular by providing for positive as well as
negative rights. 115 Moreover, many contemporary constitutional scholars have shown that judicial
enforcement of Bill of Rights protections did little to preserve civil liberties when they were challenged
in times of crisis. 116 It has been less widely noted, however, that the writing and adoption of the Bill of
Rights also support a more skeptical account of our constitutional history.
As already noted, the original Constitution contained no Bill of Rights and many of the framers
thought that textual protection for civil liberties was either unwise or unnecessary, or both. The people
who wanted a Bill of Rights were not the authors of the Constitution, but their opponents. 117 Moreover,
even the opponents tended to favor a Bill of Rights that applied only to the federal government. For
most Antifederalists, a bill of rights was a means to limit federal power and, therefore, to leave the
states free to protect or restrict the rights as they choose. 118 This conception is far removed from the
modern idea of textual protection for the individual against all of government.
The battle for ratification was closely contested, and some Federalists – most prominently,
James Madison -- promised promptly to amend the Constitution once it had been adopted. 119
Historians disagree about whether Madison authentically changed his mind and came to favor such
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amendments or whether his sponsorship of them was motivated solely by political the political necessity
of winning reelection to Congress and persuading North Carolina and Rhode Island to join the union. 120
Whatever his personal motives, though, it is clear that the amendments he proposed made no one
happy.
Madison himself apparently doubted the efficacy of a bill of rights. Only months earlier, he had
written to Jefferson that “experience proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights on those occasions when its
controul is most needed.” 121 The Federalists who dominated the new Congress were even more
skeptical. Madison was repeatedly frustrated in his efforts to get the House of Representatives even to
consider the amendments. Members thought that they had more important matters to attend to. 122
When debate finally started, many voiced strong opposition 123 and, ultimately, adopted the provisions
only grudgingly. 124
One might suppose that passage of the provisions therefore amounted to a victory for the
Antifederalists. In fact, though, many Antifederalists felt betrayed by the proposals that Madison
advanced and that Congress adopted. 125 They had hoped that that the Constitution would be revised so
as to more clearly limit federal power in general. In particular, they favored provisions that would have
120
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limited federal taxing power, banned a federal standing army, and made clear that there were no
implied federal powers. What they got instead was nothing at all with regard to taxes, a pale, indirect,
and ineffective reference to standing armies in the second and third amendments, and a plainly
inadequate tenth amendment that, far from limiting implied powers, seemed to invite them. 126
The tenth amendment was especially galling. The analogous provision in the Articles of
Confederation had limited the federal government to powers expressly granted. Tellingly, Madison’s
proposal left out the word “expressly.” Congressman Thomas Tucker tried to remedy this alleged defect
by inserting this word, 127 but, Madison opposed the change on the ground that it was “impossible to
confine a Government to the exercise of express powers; there must necessarily be admitted power by
implication.” 128 Tucker’s amendment was defeated. 129 The upshot was language and legislative history
that could easily be read to expand rather than restrict federal power.
Thus, neither side attached much significance to the Bill of Rights. Instead, both sides seem to
have had doubts about the importance or efficacy of textual protection for individual rights – doubts
reinforced by what happened in the years following ratification of the amendments. Although
antebellum the Court invalidated more federal statutes than commonly supposed, 130 it did not use the
Bill of Rights to invalidate a major piece of legislation until over half a century after ratification of the Bill
of Rights, when it decided the infamous Dred Scott case. 131 The Court did not invalidate a statute under
the free speech clause of the first amendment until 1965. 132
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Controversy surrounding the ninth amendment further illustrates the skepticism of the founding
generation. The amendment provides “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” Although the meaning of the
Amendment remains obscure and disputed, the history behind it is clear. In the run up to ratification of
the Constitution, some Federalists answered the demand for a bill of rights with the argument that the
specification of rights would inevitably be incomplete and might imply that the rights not specified were
unprotected. 133 When Madison introduced the Bill of Rights in the House he acknowledged that ‘[t]his
was one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard against the admission of a bill of rights” but
observed that It “might be guarded against” by enactment of the ninth amendment. 134
Commentators have disagreed about the precise meaning of the ninth amendment. 135 There is
no need to rehearse that dispute here. For present purposes, the key point is that on all interpretations,
the amendment reflected widespread skepticism that a written constitution could sufficiently constrain
government power. Importantly, the amendment guards against the disparagement of other rights –
that is, rights other than those specified in the Constitution. What, precisely, were these other rights?
No doubt, people in the founding generation had opinions about what they were, but the ninth
amendment amounts to a concession that it was impossible to reduce these opinions to constitutional
text. Put differently, the ninth amendment embodies skepticism that any constitutional document can
fully capture the norms that should govern a society. It is an express disavowal of Justice Iredell’s
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ambition to write a Constitution that “define[d] with precision the objects of the legislative power, and
[restrained] its exercise within marked and settled boundaries.” 136
3. The Special Case of Thomas Jefferson. Although Thomas Jefferson was not in Philadelphia
and did not participate directly in either the ratification struggle or the adoption of the Bill of Rights, 137
he occupies iconic status in the standard story of American constitutionalism. According to that story,
Jefferson was a “strict constructionist” who strongly supported constitutional restrictions on federal
power and constitutional protections for individual rights. As he once wrote, “Our peculiar security is in
possession of a written Constitution. Let us not make it a blank paper by construction.” 138 Jefferson’s
unsuccessful opposition on constitutional grounds to the creation of a national bank while in the
Washington Administration, 139 his secret authorship of the Kentucky Resolutions opposing the Alien and
Sedition Acts while vice-president, 140 his principled refusal to endorse internal improvements without a
constitutional amendment, 141 and his life-long devotion to religious liberty 142 all contribute his image as
a fastidious constitutionalist.
This story is not false. Jefferson was a strict constructionist, a believer in limited government
and individual rights, and a defender of constitutional fidelity. But Jefferson was also an immensely
complicated figure. Never a particularly systematic thinker, his writings and career are full of
contradictions and ambiguities that have puzzled and enraged historians ever since. As Joseph Ellis aptly
characterizes him, he has become “the enigmatic and elusive touchstone for the most cherished
136
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convictions and contested truths in American culture,” and “the Great Sphinx of American history.” 143 It
is therefore not surprising that there is another side to Jefferson’s constitutional thought, much less
often recognized and virtually never celebrated: Throughout his life, Jefferson was a constitutional
skeptic.
This skepticism took a variety of forms. First, and most dramatically, Jefferson denied the
legitimate power of the authors of constitutions to bind the future. His first statement of this view
seems to have been in a letter to his friend, Madison shortly after the Constitution was ratified. There,
he defended the principle that “’the earth belongs in usufruct to the living’ that the dead have neither
powers nor rights over it.” 144 From this “self-evident” 145 proposition, Jefferson derived his theory of
generational limits on constitutional obligation. On his view, “by the law of nature, one generation is to
another as one independent nation is to another.” 146 It followed that
[Members of the living generation] are masters . . . of their own persons, and consequently may
govern them as they please. But persons and property make the sum of objects of government.
The constitution and the laws of their predecessors extinguished then in their natural course
with those who gave them being. This could preserve their being till it ceased to be itself, and
no longer. . . . Every constitution, then, and every law, naturally expires at the end of 19 years. If
it be enforced longer, this is an act of force, and not of right. 147
Jefferson seems to have held these views throughout his life. After retirement, in a famous
letter to Samuel Kercheval, Jefferson proposed amendments to the Virginia Constitution, including a
built-in nineteen year expiration date, which, he argued, corresponded to the life-span of a single
generation. He again insisted on the right of “each generation . . . to choose for itself the form of
government it believes most promotive of its own happiness; consequently, to accommodate to the
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circumstances in which it finds itself, that received from its predecessors.” 148 Eight years later, and only
two years before his death, he wrote to John Cartwright that “a generation may bind itself as long as its
majority continues in life; when that has disappeared, another majority is in place, holds all the rights
and powers their predecessors once held, and may change their laws and institutions to suit themselves.
. . . Nothing then is unchangeable but the inherent and unalienable rights of man.” 149
Second, Jefferson was deeply skeptical of judicial power in particular and of any authoritative,
hierarchical system of constitutional enforcement in general. Jefferson’s hatred of John Marshall and
his anger at the Marshall Court’s assertion of judicial power in Marbury v. Madison 150 are well known. 151
Early in his career, he seems to have been a supporter of judicial review, 152 but his experience with a
Federalist-dominated judiciary was enough to convince him that federal judges were a “corps of sappers
and miners constantly working under ground to undermine the foundations of our confederated
fabric” 153 and that an independent federal judiciary was “a solecism, at least in a republican
government.” 154 At times, Jefferson suggested that there should be no federal judiciary at all. 155
Part of Jefferson’s skepticism about federal courts was grounded in his opposition to what he
perceived as the nationalizing agenda of the federal judiciary. But the skepticism was also grounded in a
more theoretical opposition to granting any single branch of government authoritative power to enforce
the Constitution. The modern label given to Jefferson’s position is “departmentalist” – that is the view
that each department of government had equal right to interpret and enforce the Constitution. 156 For
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example, Jefferson believed that he had independent authority to determine that the Alien and Sedition
Acts were unconstitutional when exercising his pardoning power. In an explanation originally to be
delivered to Congress, but ultimately deleted for political reasons he wrote
Our country has thought proper to distribute the powers of its government among three equal
& independent authorities, constituting each a check on one or both of the others, in all
attempts to impair its constitution. To make each an effectual check, it must have a right in
cases which arise within the line of its proper functions, where, equally with others, it acts in the
last resort & its own judgment, & uncontrouled by the opinion of any other department. We
have accordingly, in more than one instance seen the opinions of different departments in
opposition to each other, & no ill ensure. 157
Later, in a letter to Abigail Adams justifying the pardons, he wrote
The judges, believing the law constitutional, had a right to pass a sentence of fine and
imprisonment, because that power was placed in their hands by the constitution. But the
Executive, believing the law to be unconstitutional, was bound to remit the execution of it;
because that power has been confided to him by the constitution. That instrument meant that
its co-ordinate branches should be checks on each other. But the opinion which gives to the
judges the right to decide what laws are constitutional, and what not, not only for themselves in
their own sphere of action, but for the legislature and executive also in their spheres, would
make the judiciary a despotic branch. 158
Today, many might accept the right of a President utilize his own constitutional judgment when
exercising the pardon power, 159 but Jefferson’s devotion to decentralized constitutional authority
extended well beyond this claim. While serving as Vice-President in the Adams Administration, he
secretly authored the Kentucky Resolutions in protest against the Alien and Sedition Acts. 160
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As originally drafted by Jefferson, the Eighth Resolution stated that each state had independent
authority to determine whether the Constitution had been violated and what the remedy should be. In
a case where the federal government assumed unconstitutional powers, “a nullification of the act is the
rightful remedy.” This was so because states had a “natural right . . . in cases not within the compact . .
. to nullify of their own authority all assumptions of power by others within their limits.” 161
The resolution ultimately adopted by the Kentucky legislature omitted the incendiary
“nullification” language. 162 The parallel Virginia Resolutions, authored by Madison, was also more
temperate. 163 But when these less radical proposals failed to generate much northern support,
Jefferson proposed a still more extreme remedy. In a letter to Madison, he urged the dissenting states
to threaten “to sever ourselves from the union we so much value, rather than give up the rights of selfgovernment which we have reserved, & in which alone we see liberty, safety & happiness.” 164
There is a sense in which Jefferson’s radical views about interpretive authority stemmed from
his devotion to constitutional fidelity. Jefferson’s allegiance was to the Constitution itself, not to
mistaken interpretations of the Constitution advanced by misguided judges or legislators. From this
perspective, it is modern believers in judicial supremacy who are unfaithful to the Constitution when
they confuse mistaken Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution with the Constitution itself.
In another sense, though, Jefferson’s views are in deep tension with our standard constitutional
story. That story rests crucially on the conflation of Supreme Court decisions with constitutional
commands. Without an authoritative interpreter, “marked and settled boundaries” become impossible.
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Instead of providing a settlement, constitutionalism becomes a site for conflict and dissension of the
sort that marked the pre-Revolutionary period. 165
Of course, decentralized constitutional authority still requires all actors to remain loyal to their
own, good faith understandings of constitutional limits. But not even this much can be said of the third
branch of Jefferson’s constitutional skepticism. It turns out that Jefferson also believed that, under
appropriate circumstances, the Constitution, even as he himself understood it, should be disobeyed.
Jefferson’s clearest statement of this belief came in a famous letter to John B. Colvin written two years
after the end of his presidency.
A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high duties of a good citizen, but
it is not the highest. The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in
danger, are of higher obligation. To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to written law,
would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoying them
with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means. 166
From this abstract statement, one might think that Jefferson believed in constitutional
disobedience only in extreme circumstances when the very survival of the state depended upon it. But
Jefferson then went on to provide a “hypothetical case” suggesting that the Constitution might
appropriately be violated in far less dire circumstances:
Suppose it had been made known to the Executive of the Union in the autumn of 1805, that we
might have the Floridas for a reasonable sum, that that sum had not indeed been so
appropriated by law, but that Congress were to meet within three weeks, and might appropriate
it on the first or second day of their session. Ought he, for so great an advantage to his country,
to have risked himself by transcending the law and making the purchase? The public advantage
offered, in this supposed case, was indeed immense; but a reverence for law, and the
probability that the advantage might still be legally accomplished by a delay of only three weeks
were powerful reasons against hazarding the act. But suppose it was foreseen that a John
Randolph would find means to protract the proceeding on it by Congress until the ensuing
spring, by which time new circumstances would change the mind of the other party. Ought the
Executive, in that case, and with that foreknowledge, to have secured the good to his country
and to have trusted to their justice for the transgression of the law? I think he ought and that
the act would have been approved. 167
165
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Two points are worth noting about this hypothetical. First, the acquisition of “the Floridas,”
while no doubt important, hardly rises to the level of “saving our country when in danger.” Second, the
hypothetical suggests that Jefferson thought it appropriate to disregard Congress’s constitutional
powers not just when it was impractical to consult with Congress, but also when opposition within
Congress (“a John Randolph” – his cousin, incidentally 168) would frustrate his goals. Taken together,
these points suggest that Jefferson was much more ready to disregard constitutional obligation than his
general language about necessity and self-preservation suggests.
Jefferson presents this problem as if it were merely hypothetical, but in fact his administration
was marked by significant decisions that, by his own lights, violated the Constitution. We can put to one
side his imposition of an embargo on foreign trade. Many others thought that the embargo was
unconstitutional, 169 but there is no evidence that Jefferson himself doubted its constitutional validity.
The same cannot be said, however, for the Louisiana Purchase, perhaps the most consequential act of
self-conscious constitutional disobedience in our history.
Early on in the negotiations with France over the vast Louisiana Territory, Jefferson seems to
have agreed with his attorney general and secretary of the treasury that “there is no constitutional
difficulty as to the acquisition of territory,” 170 although he appears to have thought a constitutional
amendment wise before any of the territory was granted statehood. 171 But as negotiations proceeded,
he began to have doubts. In one private letter, he wrote that “Our confederation is certainly confined
to the limits established by the revolution. . . . The general government has no powers but such as the
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constitution has given it; and it has not given it a power of holding foreign territory, and still less of
incorporating it into the Union. An amendment to the Constitution seems necessary for this” 172
Gradually, these doubts seem to have hardened into conviction. Jefferson wrote to a close
friend that “I cannot help believing the intention was to permit Congress to admit into the union new
states, which should be formed out of territory for which & under whose authority alone they were
acting. I do not believe it was meant that they might receive England, Ireland, Holland, &c. into it.” 173
Accordingly, Jefferson began drafting proposed constitutional amendments to legalize the acquisition.
It soon became apparent, however, that constitutional scruples might prevent consummation of
the purchase. Both France and Spain looked like they might back out of the deal, and haste in ratifying it
became imperative. 174 Faced with this difficulty, Jefferson concluded that “the less that is said about my
constitutional difficulty, the better; and . . . it will be desirable for Congress to do what is necessary in
silence.” 175 The proposed amendments were dropped, and Jefferson went forward with the transaction
despite his own constitutional objections.
Although Jefferson himself believed his actions were unconstitutional, few contemporaries
shared his doubts. 176 In contrast, a second, albeit less consequential, action taken by Jefferson was
unquestionably unconstitutional. When the British attacked an American ship in 1807, Jefferson
ordered the purchase of material to build gun boats without prior congressional authorization in clear
violation of Article I, section 9, clause 7 of the Constitution, which prohibits withdrawing money from
the treasury without “Appropriations made by Law.” 177 Only after the purchase did Jefferson ask for and
receive congressional approval, albeit over the heated objections of the aforementioned John Randolph,
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who complained that the President had violated his constitutional obligations. 178 In his letter to Colvin
five years later, Jefferson was unrepentant:
After the affair of the Chesapeake, we thought war a very possible result. Our magazines were
illy provided with some necessary articles, nor had any appropriations been made for their
purchase. We ventured, however, to provide them, and to place our country in safety; and
stating the case to Congress, they sanctioned the act. 179
How are we to reconcile Thomas Jefferson, the believer in limited government, strict
constructionist, and defender of constitutional purism with Thomas Jefferson, the constitutional skeptic
unwilling to accept the binding force of the Constitution on future generations and ready to disregard
limits on his power when he viewed it necessary to do so? Jefferson had a long career and doubtless
changed his mind about some things. Not all his writings were fully thought out or grew out of deep,
theoretical reflection. Like all politicians, he sometimes sacrificed his more general convictions to the
necessities imposed by specific events. Ironically, his constitutional fastidiousness also contributed to
his propensity to disregard constitutional limits. Few of Jefferson’s contemporaries thought that there
was a conflict between the Louisiana Purchase and constitutional commands. It was only because
Jefferson read the Constitution so narrowly that he had to face the hard choice about whether to violate
it.
But one cannot study Jefferson’s career and writings without suspecting a deeper source for his
ambivalence. Jefferson’s own career captured the contradiction at the core of constitutional origins.
Jefferson was, after all, the principal author of the Declaration of Independence. He was responsible for
revolutionary defiance of legal authority in 1776, but, when he was elected President of the United
States in 1801, he became the embodiment of legal authority. How could a reflective person who
assumed both these roles possibly escape contradiction?
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One side of that contradiction – the side that prized constitutional obedience and celebrated
constitutional restraint – is central to the mainstream story about constitutionalism’s triumph. But
Thomas Jefferson also had another side– a side that chafed at authority, abhorred stasis, and privileged
deep moral convictions over positive law. That side, too, deserves attention and respect.
C. Nullification, Concurrent Majorities, Secession, and the Civil War
On standard accounts, southern secessionism led to the greatest threat to constitutional
governance in our history. Southern radicals effectively seized control of almost half the country and
mounted a treasonous war for human bondage and against the rule of law. The North responded by
fighting to preserve the Union, and its victory constituted a decisive repudiation of doctrines like
interposition, nullification, and a right of secession, which threatened the Constitution.
In this section, I intend to complicate this account. Elements of southern secessionist thought
did raise important doubts about constitutional obligation, and many in the North did think of
themselves as fighting to preserve the Constitution. But drawing the battle lines in this simple way
misses the irony and paradox embedded in the arguments on both sides. On the one hand, the case for
nullification was grounded in constitutional obligation. Even secessionists often insisted that their
position was based on respect for, rather than defiance of, the Constitution. On the other hand, many
northern abolitionists flirted with secession and constitutional disobedience, and, when war finally
came, Lincoln himself at least arguably privileged preservation of union and termination of slavery over
strict constitutional obligation.
The more interesting point, though, is that both northern and southern argument blurred the
line between constitutional fidelity and defiance. The strength of our constitutional tradition forced
both sides to cloak their stance in constitutional rhetoric, but sometimes the rhetoric did the work of
justifying revolutionary insubordination. Just as Jefferson was torn between his commitment to the
Declaration of Independence and to the Constitution, so, too, northerners and southerners alike
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unselfconsciously mixed together the language of natural right and revolution with the language of legal
obligation and constitutional precommitment.
1. John C. Calhoun, and the theory of concurrent majorities. John C. Calhoun, the most
important and sophisticated theoretician of Southern resistance, developed elaborate arguments
supporting the power of states as against federal authority. 180 Today, many commentators have
marginalized Calhoun. On their view, his political position is ineradicably tainted by his support for
slavery, and his theoretical position was decisively defeated in the Civil War. In particular, his support
for nullification – the view that states could “nullify” federal decisions that violated the Constitution -and the theory of concurrent majorities – the view that legal legitimacy required majority approval by
subnational units -- are treated as amounting to an antiquated and discredited rejection of
constitutional supremacy. 181
There can be no doubt that Calhoun spent much of his career justifying an economic and social
system built on totalitarian suppression, and it is deeply wrong to insulate his theoretical musings from
the purpose to which he put them. Still, the standard view radically oversimplifies Calhoun’s theories,
and, by extension, the complicated interplay of constitutionalism and constitutional skepticism that
provided the intellectual backdrop for the Civil War.
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To understand the complexity, we need to separate out three aspects of Calhoun’s thought: his
position on constitutional obedience, his position on the Constitution’s meaning, and his position on the
appropriate means of constitutional enforcement.
With regard to the first question, Calhoun unambiguously and consistently presented himself as
a constitutionalist. His argument in both the Disquisition and the Discourse, his two most important
theoretical works, 182 is shot through with assertions about the importance of constitutional governance
as a means of controlling what Calhoun thought were dangerous tendencies toward individual
willfulness that, in turn, translated into government tyranny. 183
Of course, support for constitutional obedience leaves open the question of what, precisely, the
Constitution commands. Calhoun’s position on the Constitution’s meaning was deeply rooted in a
communitarian model of politics, which he associated with the sovereignty of individual states. He
thought that political identity was inextricably wrapped up in community identity, which gave meaning
to and appropriately constrained individual impulses. 184
The importance of community leads to resistance to centralized power that has the potential to
override community autonomy. Calhoun therefore favored a political system marked by what modern
political scientists call “veto gates,” but that Calhoun referred to as a requirement of “concurrent
majorities.” 185 On this view, an overall majority throughout the polity is insufficient to justify
impositions on minority communities. Instead, there must be concurrent majorities in each affected
community.
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Calhoun’s substantive theory has an obvious connection to standard Madisonian republicanism.
Like Madison, he thought that majority faction could be controlled by dividing power and requiring the
approval of different institutions responsible to different constituencies. 186 He nonetheless departed
from Madison in rejecting the claim that a large, geographically extended republic provided the best
protection against faction. Calhoun put more faith in the Antifederalist commitment to localism and
state autonomy.
This leads us, finally, to the question of constitutional enforcement. Because the greatest threat
of majority tyranny came from the central government, it followed that constitutional enforcement
could not be left to federal agents. To maintain constitutional government, the states had legitimate
power to nullify unconstitutional acts by the federal government at least temporarily until supporters of
federal action could secure an amendment to the Constitution confirming their interpretation. 187 Put
differently, on Calhoun’s view, it was the people willing to acquiesce supinely to federal usurpation who
tolerated constitutional disobedience. True constitutionalism required state resistance to
unconstitutional federal action.
Once all this is understood, it becomes clear that there is a sense in which Calhoun was not a
constitutional skeptic at all. 188 But his thought also demonstrates that there is no bright-line distinction
between obedience and defiance and that skeptical impulses often lies buried within the rhetoric of
obedience.
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The problem is produced by three, interlocking facts. First, constitutionalism has the potential
to delegitimize as well as legitimize exercises of power. An insistence on constitutional obedience can
be put to revolutionary purposes. Thus, for Calhoun, the Constitution, properly understood, provided
grounding for southern resistance to northern power. Second, the Constitution’s meaning is often
contestable. Calhoun interpreted the Constitution in a certain way, but others had different, conflicting
interpretations. Finally, constitutional construction is always influenced by the intersection of
theoretical concerns on the one hand and political expediency on the other. For example, both Lincoln
and Calhoun had ideas about tyranny, freedom, and minority rights that influenced the way in which
they read the Constitution. Both were politicians who used constitutional argument instrumentally to
advance their positions.
Taken together, these three points mean that there will often be an ambiguous line dividing
constitutionalism from rebellion. Because the Constitution’s meaning is contested and because it
provides a platform from which one can attack current distributions of power, constitutional rhetoric
can support destabilization as well as settlement. Thus, to northern ears Calhoun’s constitutionalism
sounded like rebellion because it was based upon what northerners thought was an egregious
misreading of the Constitution. From this perspective, Calhoun’s preferred method of enforcement –
state nullification – looked like a rejection of the supremacy clause of Article VI and outright defiance of
legitimate constitutional authority. From the perspective of Calhoun and his supporters, these same
arguments were thought to serve the cause of constitutional obedience rather than defiance.
Moreover, Calhoun himself contributed to the blurring of the line between constitutional fidelity
and defiance. Calhoun’s interpretation of vague and ambiguous language in the Constituion was
influenced by his particular conception of natural rights. Given this inevitable overlap between
constitutional interpretation and background theoretical assumptions, it was easy for him to combine a
worked out theory of constitutional interpretation with an argument grounded in extra-constitutional
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political morality. 189 The Constitution was worthy of support precisely because it embodied principles
that would support constitutional resistance if constitutional meaning were different. 190 There was
therefore no contradiction in mixing the language of constitutional obedience with language that would
support rebellion against an unjust constitution.
2. Secession. Calhoun died in 1850, 191 the year of the compromise that put off the Civil War for
a decade and before secessionists seriously threatened the union. 192 When the breakup finally came,
there was no theoretician of his sophistication and ability to defend the South’s actions. 193 Nonetheless,
the justificatory rhetoric of secession was marked by the same ambiguity and contradiction that was
central to Calhoun’s earlier work.
Southerners often justified their act of supreme defiance in overtly constitutional terms. 194 For
example, in a speech before Congress as the Fort Sumter crisis unfolded, Jefferson Davis proclaimed that
“[w]e claim our rights under the constitution; we claim our rights reserved to the States; and we seek by
no brute force to gain any advantage which the law and the Constitution do not give us.” 195
Remarkably, a few months later in his inaugural speech as he assumed office as the Confederacy’s first
and only President, Davis again invoked the United States Constitution. “The Constitution formed by our
fathers,” he asserted “is that of these Confederate States.” 196 In Davis’s view, calling secession a
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revolution was “an abuse of language.” 197 Secession was, instead, an effort “to save ourselves from a
revolution.” 198
Given this stance, it is no surprise that framers of the Confederate Constitution closely followed
the text of the original United States Constitution 199 For many southerners, disunion, like nullification,
was a method of constitutional enforcement that, they hoped, would bring the north to its senses and
lead to reunion on a sound constitutional footing. 200 According to Davis, the collapse of union was not
because of “the defect of the system,” the mechanisms of which were “wonderful, surpassing that
which the solar system furnishes for our contemplation.” Rather, the collapse was caused by “the
perversion of the Constitution,” by, for example, efforts to suppress slavery in the territories and failure
to enforce the Constitution’s fugitive slave clause. The result, on his view, was the “substitution of
theories of morals for principles of government.” 201
The fact that the attempt to dissolve the Constitution could itself be justified in constitutional
terms illustrates just how slippery the distinction is between constitutionalism and its opposite. And
indeed, southern rhetoric seamlessly integrated the language of revolutionary anticonstitutionalism
with the language of constitutional fidelity. In the same speech in which Davis claimed “our rights under
the Constitution,” he also invoked the natural right of rebellion.
If I must have revolution, I say let it be a revolution such as our fathers made when they were
denied their natural rights. . . .
197
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Washington and Jackson . . . are often presented as authority against [revolution] –
Washington who led the army of the Revolution; Washington, whose reputation rests upon the
fact that with the sword he cut the cord which bound the Colonies to Great Britain . . . .
Washington, who presided when the States seceded from the [Articles of] Confederation, and
formed the union, in disregard of the claims of the States not agreeing to it; and Jackson,
glorious old soldier, who, in his minority, upon the sacred soil of South Carolina, bled for the
cause of revolution and the overthrow of a Government which he believed to be oppressive. 202
Consider, as well, a remarkably sophisticated speech defending secession given by Judah P.
Benjamin, who went on to serve in the cabinet of the Confederacy. Benjamin effortlessly combined
arguments grounded in constitutional obedience with arguments grounded in constitutional skepticism.
Benjamin’s argument begins with an echo of Jefferson’s rejection of the ability of one generation to bind
another:
[T]he right of the people of one generation, in convention duly assembled, to alter the
institutions bequeathed by their fathers is inherent, inalienable, not susceptible of restriction; . .
. [B]y the same power under which one Legislature can repeal the act of a former Legislature,, so
can one convention of the people duly assembled . . . . 203
But Benjamin apparently saw no contradiction between assertion of this “inalienable” right to disregard
the Constitution on the one hand and assertion of rights derived from the Constitution on the other.
[T]he President of the United States tells us that he does not admit [the right of secession] to be
constitutional, that it is revolutionary. I have endeavored . . . to show that [secession] . . . grows
out of the Constitution, and is not in violation of it. If I am asked how I will distinguish this from
revolutionary abuse, the answer is prompt and easy. These States, parties to the compact, have
a right to withdraw from it, by virtue of its own provisions are violated by the other parties to
the compact . . . .[sic] 204
Southern schizophrenia on the legal and moral justification for secession should come as no
surprise. There is, after all, no necessary contradiction between an argument insisting that there is a
constitutional right to secession and an argument insisting that there is a natural right to secession
whether the Constitution authorizes it or not. Yet if there is not a contradiction, there is at least a
tension between the two positions. If there is a natural right to ignore constitutional provisions when
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they invade rights, then, it would seem, there is a natural right to resist constitutionally protected
secession if one thought that disunion invaded rights. 205 This tension is built into the genetic material of
a country founded on both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. It is the tension that
has allowed both constitutionalism and constitutional skepticism to flourish throughout our history.
3. The North. The speeches and writings of Calhoun, Davis, and Benjamin are part of our
constitutional tradition’s anti-canon. They are marginalized, discredited, or ignored because, rightly or
wrongly, they are thought to embody constitutional defiance. In contrast, the words of northern
abolitionists and defenders of union are part of the canon. They are glorified because they are thought
to embody the goodness and permanence of constitutional government. 206 But just as it is too simple to
characterize the South’s defenders as anti-constitutionalists, so too northerners were not uniform and
consistent defenders of constitutional obligation.
We can begin with the fact that, long before the Civil War, many northerners openly flirted with
secession. According to one of his biographers, John Calhoun first learned of arguments favoring
secession by listening to Timothy Dwight, the President of Yale College, who was reacting to Jefferson’s
election as President. 207 Some leading Federalists went beyond talk and actually plotted to secede. 208
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During the War of 1812, New England states took numerous measures to obstruct the war
effort. Toward the end of the war, Massachusetts convened the Hartford Convention, attended by it
and other New England states, to consider secession. 209 Ultimately, the Convention stepped back from
the precipice, but only after passing a resolution warning that if its demands were not met “it will be
expedient for the legislatures of the several States to appoint delegates to another convention to meet
at Boston, with such powers and instructions as the exigency of a crisis so momentous may require.” 210
As tensions surrounding slavery mounted, the same schizophrenia about constitutional
obedience that dominated southern rhetoric also began to appear in the north. A few intrepid
abolitionist lawyers like Lysander Spooner and Alvan Stewart argued in court that the Constitution
limited slavery, although their arguments had no discernible effect. 211 Even abolitionist judges rejected
the arguments, but they, too wrapped themselves in constitutional obligation when they upheld the
claims of southern slaveholders. On the other hand, more radical abolitionists embraced constitutional
disobedience. William Lloyd Garrison chose Independence Day to publicly burn the Constitution and
denounced it as a pact with the devil. 212 Although he eventually changed his mind, Frederick Douglas
originally argued that for northern secession from the southern states. 213 On the eve of the Civil War,
Wendell Philips argued that “dissolution of the Union, sure to result speedily in the abolition of slavery,
would be a lesser evil than the slow faltering disease.” 214
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Even mainstream political figures on occasion, embraced anti-constitutional language. During
the debate over the Compromise of 1850, Senator William Seward, later Lincoln’s secretary of state,
argued that the “law of liberty” was a “higher law than the Constitution,” and that this law would not be
satisfied until the South, albeit “in your time and your own manner,” yielded “to the progress of
emancipation.” 215 Similarly, William Ellery Channing, the foremost Unitarian clergyman in the United
States claimed that “A higher law than the Constitution protests against [the Fugitive Slave Act]. 216
Both abolitionism and constitutional disobedience remained minority positions well into the
Civil War, yet as conflict with the South intensified, willingness to stretch or ignore the Constitution
increased as well. Many northerners participated in the effort to obstruct slaveholders who attempted
to exercise their constitutional right to capture slaves who had fled to the north, and a courageous few
participated in the “underground railroad” that led to freedom. 217 There was talk of nullification, and
one northern radical wrote that “we have got to come to Calhoun’s ground.” 218 The Republican Party
ran on a platform that promised a refusal to enforce the Dred Scott decision, and some state legislatures
voted to nullify it. 219 Although John Brown’s violent and illegal raid was widely condemned even in the
North, a handful of northerners treated Brown as a hero. 220
4. The Special Case of Abraham Lincoln. On the spectrum of northern, Republican opinion,
Lincoln was at best a moderate. A lifelong opponent of slavery, he nonetheless repeatedly promised not
to interfere with it in states where it already existed. He acknowledged that southerners had the right
to the return of escaped slaves and conceded that emancipation would have to be gradual and that
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slaveholders should be compensated for their loss. 221 Although he appears to have changed his mind at
the very end of his life, until then, he believed that free African Americans could not successfully live
with whites, and repeatedly backed a variety of schemes that would lead to their departure from the
United States. 222
Moreover, throughout his adult life, Lincoln presented himself as a fervent believer in
constitutionalism and a defender of constitutional government. As a young man, he first gained
notoriety with his “Lyceum Address,” which criticized “mob rule” and urged “every American . . . [to]
swear by the blood of the Revolution, never to violate in the least particular, the laws of the country;
and never to tolerate their violation by others.” 223 Over two decades later, he began his campaign for
the Republican nomination for President with his famous Cooper Union speech, where he made a
remarkably lawyerly, constitutional argument against the result in Dred Scott. 224 He justified the
Emancipation Proclamation as a constitutional exercise of his war power to seize enemy property, and
he stubbornly and scrupulously declined to extend it to areas where, in his judgment, emancipation
lacked military, and therefore constitutional, justification. 225
But Lincoln’s constitutionalism, like Jefferson’s, was ambivalent and contradictory. Exclusive
focus on his belief in constitutional fidelity misses much of his complexity and greatness. Consider, first
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the Lyceum Address. There is no mistaking Lincoln’s fervent support for constitutionalism and the rule
of law. But just beneath the surface is the same tension that has bedeviled constitutionalism
throughout our history. Could Lincoln have been completely unaware of the irony when he urged his
fellow Americans to “swear by the blood of the Revolution” not to violate the law? And what are we to
make of this remarkable passage, which, in light of subsequent events, has puzzled and fascinated
Lincoln’s many biographers. 226 After praising the courage and fortitude of the founding generation, he
added:
This field of glory is harvested, and the crop is already appropriated. But new reapers will arise,
and they, too, will seek a field. It is to deny, what the history of the world tells us is true, to
suppose that men of ambition and talents will not continue to spring up amongst us. And, when
they do, they will as naturally seek the gratification of their ruling passion, as others have so
done before them. The question then is, can that gratification be found in supporting and
maintaining an edifice that has been erected by others? Most certainly it cannot. . . .Towering
genius distains a beaten path. . . . It thirsts and burns for distinction; and, if possible, it will have
it, whether at the expense of emancipating slaves, or enslaving freemen. 227
Lincoln hastened to disown the subversive implications of this language. In the very next
passage, he states that he does not admire “towering genius” of this sort. On the contrary, “it will
require the people to be united with each other, attached to the government and laws, and generally
intelligent, to successfully frustrate his designs.” 228 But in light of his subsequent career, it is hard to
take this disclaimer at face value. Early in life, Lincoln set for himself the goal of achieving the very sort
of glory that he describes. 229 Can it really be that the Great Emancipator himself meant to
unambiguously condemn a “towering genius” who overcame “the government and laws” by
“emancipating slaves”?
The Cooper Union speech contains a similar ambiguity. Lincoln began the speech rhetorically
asking “what is the frame of Government under which we live?” and responding that “The answer must
226
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be: ‘The Constitution of the United States.’” It is constitutional obligation, he tells us, that “furnishes a
precise and an agreed starting point for a discussion between Republicans and that wing of the
Democracy headed by [his political opponent] Senator [Stephen] Douglas.” 230
Lincoln then proceeded to make a detailed, persuasive, and legalistic argument that the federal
government had constitutional power to prohibit slavery in the territories. He relied upon the standard
tools of constitutional interpretation: the Constitution’s language, the intent of the framers, and
historical practice before and immediately after the Constitution was ratified. 231 This is unquestionably
the language of American constitutionalism.
But then, as the speech draws to a close, comes this:
If slavery is right, all words, acts, laws, and constitutions against it, are themselves wrong, and
should be silenced, and swept away. If it is right, we cannot justly object to its nationality – its
universality; if it is wrong, they cannot justly insist upon its extension – its enlargement. All they
ask, we could readily grant, if we thought slavery right; all we ask, they could as readily grant, if
they thought it wrong. They thinking it right, and our thinking it wrong, is the precise fact upon
which depends the whole controversy. Thinking it right, as they do, they are not to blame for
desiring its full recognition, as being right; but, thinking it wrong, as we do, can we yield to
them? Can we cast our votes with their view, and against our own? In view of our moral, social,
and political responsibilities, can we do this? 232
Lincoln’s answer is a resounding “no.” The last lines of his speech are far removed from the
claim that dry and disinterested constitutional analysis will or should resolve the dispute over slavery.
Instead, he gave full throated endorsement to the primacy of moral obligation: “LET US HAVE FAITH
THAT RIGHT MAKES MIGHT, AND IN THAT FAITH, LET US, TO THE END, DARE TO DO OUR DUTY AS WE
UNDERSTAND IT.” 233
It turns out, then, that even if, as Lincoln claimed, constitutional meaning is a “precise and
agreed starting point for discussion,” it is not the ending point. After all the legal argument is finished, it
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is not the Constitution, but the moral status of slavery that is the “precise fact upon which depends the
whole controversy.”
The tension between Lincoln’s commitment to constitutionalism and his commitment to extraconstitutional morality extended beyond his rhetoric. It marked his entire administration. Consider first
the actions Lincoln took unilaterally immediately after assuming office. With Congress not in session
and facing a military emergency, he suspended habeas corpus in particular areas. 234 When a judge had
the audacity to issue a writ requiring the release of an under-aged soldier who allegedly enlisted without
the consent of his parents, the soldier’s commander refused to comply and arrested the lawyer who
served the writ. Not satisfied with even this result, Secretary of State Seward stopped payment on the
judge’s salary. 235 A few months later, Chief Justice Taney issued a writ ordering the release of a
Confederate supporter, John Merryman, and ruling that Lincoln had acted unconstitutionally by
suspending the writ. 236 Lincoln simply ignored the opinion. 237
The Constitution specifically provides for the suspension of habeas corpus when in “Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it,” 238 but many scholars think that the President
may not exercise this authority without congressional authorization. 239 Lincoln evidently disagreed, but
the important point is that he thought he acted rightly even if he violated the Constitution. In his
famous speech to Congress on July 4, 1861, he argued that the Framers intended to allow the executive
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to suspend the writ, at least when Congress was not in session. But he coupled this legal defense with
the assertion that, even if his constitutional argument was incorrect, he had nonetheless done the right
thing.
The whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully executed were being resisted and
failing of execution in nearly one-third of the States. Must they be allowed to finally fail of
execution, even had it been perfectly clear that by the use of the means necessary to their
execution some single law, made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen’s liberty that
practically it relieves more of the guilty than of the innocent, should to a very limited extent be
violated? To state the question more directly, are all the laws but one to go unexecuted and the
Government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated? Even in such a case would not the
official oath be broken if the Government should be overthrown, when it was believed that
disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it? 240
Suspension of habeas corpus was not the only constitutionally dubious action Lincoln took
during the 1861 crisis. Like Jefferson before him, he spent unauthorized funds to raise troops, thereby
violating not only Article I, §9, cl. 7, which prohibits expenditures except “in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law” but also Article I, §7, cl. 12, which gives Congress the seemingly exclusive
power to raise and support Armies.”. 241 In his July 4 speech, he did not even try to defend the legality of
these expenditures. Instead he insisted that this action “whether strictly legal or not” was justified by
“popular demand and a public necessity.” 242
Even this was not Lincoln’s most egregious legal violation. In the immediate wake of the attack
on Fort Sumter, he secretly ordered military officials to enter into private contracts for the supply of
military equipment in violation of appropriations measures and existing law. Lincoln did not discuss
these expenditures in his July 4 speech. They remained secret for months until Congress discovered
them. 243 At that point, Lincoln made no effort to defend the legality of what he had done. Instead, he
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confessed that his actions were “without any authority of law,” and acknowledged that he was
responsible for “whatever error, wrong, or fault was committed.” 244
Throughout the War, Lincoln authorized many other actions that were constitutionally dubious.
For example, after former Congressman Clement Vallandigham gave a speech attacking pursuit of the
War, he was arrested, tried, and incarcerated in seeming violation of his first amendment rights. A
public outcry ensued, and Lincoln, unwilling to turn him into a martyr, responded by ordering
Vallandigham’s expulsion from the United States. 245 At least Vallandigham had a trial. Thousands of
other citizens were placed in executive detention without the benefit of trial. 246
Most commentators treat these incidents as constitutionally justified but nonetheless
regrettable at best, or as constitutional lapses perhaps excusable at worst. 247 The Emancipation
Proclamation is very different. No one today apologizes for it or treats it as a source of regret. It is
universally celebrated and widely thought to be among a handful of the greatest decisions ever made by
an American President. Accordingly, if the Proclamation counts as an example of constitutional
disobedience, it transforms the narrative of American constitutionalism.
Does it so count? Any fair treatment of the Proclamation must acknowledge its ambiguous
straddling of the border between the conflicting traditions of constitutional fidelity and constitutional
skepticism. Defenders of constitutional fidelity can point to the fact that Lincoln himself never
admitted that the Proclamation was unconstitutional. On the contrary, he strongly defended it as an
appropriate exercise of his commander in chief power and, to the consternation of some of his more

244

th

Cong. Globe, 37 Cong., 2d Sess. At 2383 (message from the President to the Senate and House).
For an account, see GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1789
TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 98-120 (2004).
246
See [Foner]
247
For generally sympathetic accounts, see J. C. RANDELL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 161-62 (1951);
DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION (2003); DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, LINCOLN THE DICTATOR 55 S.D. L. REV. 284 (2010).
245

60
radical allies, carefully cabined its geographical effect to locations where liberation advanced the war
effort. 248
Despite these facts, there is strong reason to count the Proclamation as an important – perhaps
the most important – act of constitutional disobedience in our history. The skeptical account of the
Proclamation begins with the sheer audacity of what Lincoln did. As historian Richard Slotkin has
written:
At the stroke of the pen some $3.5 billion in property was legally annihilated – this at a time
when national GDP was less than $4.5 billion and national wealth (the total value of all property)
was about $16 billion. In purely economic terms, this was an expropriation of property on a
scale approaching that of Henry VIII’s seizures of church properties during the Reformation,
exceeded only by the nationalization of factories and farms after the Bolshevik Revolution. 249
Lincoln, together with almost everyone else in mid-19th century America, thought that these
property rights were constitutionally protected, and he said so repeatedly. In his most extensive speech
on slavery before his election, delivered in Peoria in 1854, Lincoln denounced it as a “monstrous
injustice,” but nonetheless acknowledged that the Constitution protected the rights of slaveholders.
Northerners were obligated to adhere to the constitutional bargain “not grudgingly, but fully, and
fairly.” The rendition of escaped slaves was “a dirty, disagreeable job,” but because of the fugitive slave
clause, Lincoln voiced support for “any legislation, for the reclaiming of their fugitives, which should not,
in its stringency, be . . . likely to carry a free man into slavery.” 250
Similarly, in his first inaugural address, Lincoln made clear that he lacked constitutional authority
to interfere with slavery 251 and stated that he had no objection to the Corwin Amendment, which would
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have permanently entrenched slavery.252 In his view, the Amendment did no more than restate
slaveholder rights already implicit in the Constitution. 253
Even after the Civil War began, Lincoln demonstrated marked reluctance to interfere with
slavery. As late as 1862 he stated that “emancipation was a subject exclusively under the control of the
states.” 254 He demonstrated little interest in enforcing the First Confiscation Act, 255 which deprived
slaveholders of their property right in slaves used to further the war effort. 256 When General John
Fremont declared martial law in Missouri and ordered emancipation of all slaves in the state as a means
of weakening the enemy, Lincoln countermanded the order and then removed Fremont from
command. 257
The strictly legal question, then, is whether military necessity and the President’s commanderin-chief authority under Article II justified a massive, permanent, uncompensated destruction of private
property and the negation of what Lincoln himself conceded would otherwise have been the
constitutional rights of slaveholders. There are strong reasons to doubt that the military necessity
argument can do this work. Indeed, Lincoln himself initially thought that it could not. In a letter to
Senator Orville Browning after the Fremont episode, Lincoln wrote that Fremont’s proclamation “is
252
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I understand a proposed amendment to the Constitution—which amendment, however, I have not
seen—has passed Congress, to the effect that the Federal Government shall never interfere with the
domestic institutions of the States, including that of persons held to service. To avoid misconstruction of
what I have said, I depart from my purpose not to speak of particular amendments so far as to say that,
holding such a provision to now be implied constitutional law, I have no objection to its being made
express and irrevocable.
254
255
256
257

Abraham Lincoln, “The First Inaugural Address,” note 251, supra.
Quoted in LOUIS P. MASUR, LINCOLN’S HUNDRED DAYS XX-XX (20XX).
Act of Aug 6, 1861, ch. 60, 12 Stat. 319.
See SILVANA R. SIDDALI, FROM PROPERTY TO PERSON: SLAVERY AND THE CONFISCATION ACTS, 1861-1862 at 19 (2005).
LOUIS P. MASUR, LINCOLN’S HUNDRED DAYS XX-XX (20XX).

62
purely political, and not within the range of military law, or necessity. . . . Can it be pretended that it is
any longer the government of the U.S. – any government of constitution and laws, -- wherein a General,
or a President, may make permanent rules of property by proclamation?” 258
Of course, it is possible that changes in military circumstances made emancipation necessary
when the Proclamation was issued even though it was not when Freemont acted. But in fact, events
occurring after Lincoln wrote this letter further weakened the military necessity argument. If military
necessity were really the reason for emancipation, one would have supposed that Lincoln would have
ordered it when the North was losing the war. Instead, Lincoln self-consciously delayed emancipation
until the North won its first major victory on the battle field. 259
Moreover, as noted above, the First Confiscation Act provided a mechanism to liberate slaves
who were used to aid the Confederate war effort. The Second Confiscation Act went further and
provided such a mechanism for slaves owned by disloyal individuals whether or not the slaves were
used to fight the war. 260 By the time of the Proclamation, then, the precise legal issue was whether
there was a military necessity justifying the emancipation of slaves not already subject to manumission
by the Confiscation Acts – that is, slaves not being used to fight the war and held by slaveholders who
were loyal to the Union. It is hard to see how emancipation of these slaves served a significant military
purpose. 261
The fact that the emancipation was permanent poses another legal difficulty. The Preliminary
Proclamation, which warned of impending emancipation if the South continued its revolt, declared that
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slaves would be “then, thenceforward, and forever free.” 262 For reasons that are somewhat mysterious,
the final Proclamation left out the word “forever,” 263 but Lincoln repeatedly and forcefully stated that he
would not rescind the Proclamation even if southern states agreed to rejoin the union. 264 Yet, ironically,
before he issued the Proclamation, Lincoln himself explained why permanent freedom could not be
justified by military necessity. In the Browning letter quoted above, he stated that
If a commanding general finds a necessity to seize the farm of a private owner . . . he has the
right to do so, and to so hold it as long as the necessity lasts; and this is within military law,
because within military necessity. But to say the farm shall no longer belong to the owner or his
heirs forever; and this as well when the farm is not needed for military purposes as when it is, is
purely political, without the savor of military law about it. And the same is true of slaves. If the
General needs them, he can seize them, and use them; but when the need is past, it is not for
him to fix their permanent future conditions. 265
For these reasons, the legal argument supporting the Emancipation Proclamation is quite
vulnerable. Of course, clever lawyers can make and have made arguments on the other side, but
focusing exclusively on the legal argument misses the crucial point. For purposes of constructing a
historical tradition, what matters most is not the technical legality of the Proclamation, but its cultural
meaning.
That meaning is directly linked to the fact that emancipation was not merely a military necessity.
To see this point, compare the Proclamation to General William Tecumseh Sherman’s widespread
destruction and seizure of civilian property during his infamous march through Georgia in 1864.
Perhaps the actions of Sherman’s troops were justified by military necessity, but no one today
celebrates those actions as an iconic moment in American history. The Emancipation Proclamation is
celebrated precisely because people understood then and understand now that it was not merely a
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military tool, the use of which was necessary but nonetheless to be regretted. Instead of advancing the
North’s war aims, the Proclamation changed those aims. A war that was fought to preserve the
Constitution became a war to dismantle the constitutional structures that protected tyranny and
oppression.
Both contemporary supporters and opponents of the Proclamation had no doubt that this was
its true meaning. For example, the New York Herald, in an editorial opposing the Proclamation, warned
that it would inaugurate a “social revolution.” 266 The Springfield Republican, in an editorial supporting
the Proclamation, came to a remarkably similar conclusion, declaring that that “by the courage and
prudence of the President, the greatest social and political revolution of the age will be triumphantly
carried through in the midst of civil war.” 267 In a letter home, a Union soldier wrote that “though the
President carefully calls [the Proclamation] nothing but a war measure . . . it is the beginning of a great
reform and the first blow struck at the real, original cause of the war.” 268 Perhaps Karl Marx, then
working as an American newspaper correspondent, put it best:
[Lincoln] sings the bavura aria of his part hesitatively, reluctantly, and unwillingly, as though
apologizing for being compelled by circumstances “to act the lion.” The most redoubtable
decrees – which will always remain remarkable historical documents – flung by him at the
enemy all look like, and are intended to look like, routine summonses sent by a lawyer to party. .
. . His latest proclamation, which is drafted in the same style, the manifesto abolishing slavery,
is the most important document in American history since the establishment of the Union,
tantamount to the tearing up of the old American Constitution. 269
Indeed, Lincoln himself acknowledged as much. Before the Proclamation, in his first inaugural
address, he made clear that he had “no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of
slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to
do so.” If there should be war, he declared, the war would be fought to support the proposition that
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“the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States” as the Constitution commanded. He
added that he had no objection to a constitutional amendment “to the effect that the Federal
Government shall never interfere with the domestic institutions of the States, including that of persons
held to service.” 270
After the Proclamation, things were different. The purpose of the war was not to ensure that
the laws be “faithfully executed in all the States,” but to show that a nation “conceived in liberty and
dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal” could “long endure.” Instead of
acquiescing to a constitutional amendment that guaranteed the rights of slave holders, Lincoln promised
“a new birth of freedom.” 271 No longer content to merely stop the spread of slavery, he declared that
“if God wills that [the war] continue until all the wealth piled by the bondsman's two hundred and fifty
years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by
another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said ‘the
judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether.’” 272
It is nonetheless true that Lincoln also supported formal, constitutional change in the form of
the thirteenth amendment, which legalized, regularized, and extended the Proclamation. Yet even the
struggle over the formal amendment process can be incorporated into the skeptical narrative.
Opponents of the Thirteenth Amendment claimed that amendments contrary to the framers’ original
intent were illegitimate. 273 Ultimately, proponents of the Amendment overcame this opposition and,
with it, the view that all major provisions in the Constitution were sacred and permanent. 274 Proponents
successfully argued that the Constitution was flawed in important respects – a skeptical theme renewed
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by Justice Thurgood Marshall over a hundred years later when, writing on the bicentennial of the
Constitution, he observed that he did not “find the wisdom, foresight, and sense of justice exhibited by
the framers particularly profound. To the contrary, the government they devised was defective from
the start.” 275
More significantly, the thirteenth amendment itself would have been unthinkable but for the
transformation in American political culture produced by the War, the Proclamation and the subsequent
enlistment of two hundred thousand African American soldiers who fought gallantly on the Union side.
African American chattel slavery is greatest injustice in our nation’s history. For three quarters of a
century, this injustice was protected by seemingly immutable constitutional text. When the injustice
was finally rectified, the efficient cause of the change was not constitutional processes, which, on the
contrary, made change seem impossible, but a bloody war that claimed over seven hundred thousand
lives.
One hundred years later, this understanding of the Civil War and of the Proclamation remains
vibrant. Virtually no one today celebrates the Proclamation as a military measure reluctantly embraced
only because otherwise sacred constitutional rights had to be ignored so as to defeat the enemy.
Instead, it symbolizes a constitutional transformation. As President Obama stated in his own
proclamation celebrating the one hundred fiftieth anniversary of Lincoln’s, “with that document,
President Lincoln lent new moral force to the war by making it a fight not just to preserve, but also to
empower. He sought to reunite our people not only in government, but also in freedom that knew no
bounds of color or creed. Every battle became a battle for liberty itself. Every struggle became a struggle
for equality.” 276
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Can there be any doubt, then, that the story of emancipation should occupy a central place in
the historical narrative of constitutional skepticism?
D. Constitutional Skepticism and the Progressive Movement
Defenders of the Progressive movement associate it with the modernization and rationalization
of government, protection of populations made vulnerable by industrialization, reform of the party
system, and the beginnings of redistributionist legislation. 277 Critics point to the racism of many
Progressives, their disregard for civil liberties, and the fact that many Progressive “reforms” shielded
entrenched interests from the discipline of market competition. 278
Modern students of Progressivism on both sides of the debate are much less likely to emphasize
the extent to which the movement offered a deep and biting challenge to American constitutionalism.
Yet especially in its early years, constitutional skepticism played a central role in progressive practice
and theory. Progressive politicians rallied popular support by railing against supposed constitutional
restraints on regulatory legislation, and Progressive theorists over a range of disciplines developed
important critiques of constitutionalism. 279
1. Progressive Politics. With the possible exception of the original Antifederalists campaign, no
political movement in American history attacked constitutionalism with as much gusto and persistence
as the Progressives. The highpoint of the attack came in 1912, when Theodore Roosevelt ran for
President on his fabled Bull Moose ticket. Roosevelt’s constitutional radicalism alienated long-time
Republican supporters like Henry Cabot Lodge and doomed his chance for the Republican nomination. 280
Undeterred, he ran as a Progressive on a party platform that declared that “the people are the masters
277

See, e.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO FDR (1955).
See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION (2006).
279
See, e.g., William E. Forbath, Popular Constitutionalism in the Twentieth Century: Reflections on the Dark
Side, the Progressive Constitutional Imagination, and the Enduring Role of Judicial Finality in Popular
Understanding of Popular Self-Rule, 81 CHI,-KENT. LAW REV. 967, 974, 976 (2006) (arguing that “Progressives set out
to rethink and remake the Constitution root and branch.”); WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES,
AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937 at 49 (1994)(noting progressive “impatience with all
constitutional orthodoxies, including the Constitution itself.”)
280
See id., at 138; William Forbath, note 279, supra, at 980.
278

68
of the Constitution” and demanded “such restrictions on the courts as shall leave to the people
legitimate authority to determine fundamental questions of social welfare and public policy.” 281
Roosevelt himself was convinced that creating a modern government required the dismantling
of separation of powers and of federalism. 282 He proposed that “the people shall themselves have the
right to say whether their representatives in the legislature and the executive office were right or
whether their representatives on the Court were right.” 283 In a speech delivered in Columbus, Ohio, he
argued that the American people must be “the masters and not the servants of even the highest court in
the land” and “the final interpreters of the Constitution.” Without this final authority “ours is not a
popular government.”
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Despite this sweeping rhetoric, Roosevelt limited his programmatic

suggestions to the recall of state judicial decisions. But in a letter to fellow progressive Herbert Croly, he
stated that “one way or the other, it will be absolutely necessary for the people themselves to take
control of the interpretation of the constitution. Even in national matters this ought to be, and in my
opinion will eventually be done.” 285
Roosevelt was hardly alone in attacking standard versions of constitutionalism. Woodrow
Wilson, who ran against Roosevelt in 1912, was much more restrained in his criticism, but Wilson had
made his academic reputation years before with a book-length attack on the constitutional structure of
the American government. 286 In 1908, he wrote that constitutional government “does not remain fixed
in any unchanging form, but . . . is altered with the change of the nation’s needs and purposes.” 287
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During the 1912 campaign, he joined Roosevelt in arguing that Article V of the Constitution should be
revised so as to make amendment much easier. 288
Robert LaFollette, perhaps the most important Progressive in Congress, called for the election
and recall of judges. He referred to judges who issued anti-labor decisions as “petty tyrants and
arrogant despots.” 289 The great social reformer, Jane Addams and Herbert Croly, the founding editor of
the New Republic and the most widely read journalistic voice for Progressivism, both insisted that social
reform could be accomplished only by dismantling constitutional obstacles. 290 Croly was especially
biting, repeatedly decrying “the monarchy of the law and the aristocracy of the robe.” 291 On two
occasions, the young Felix Frankfurter wrote in the pages of Croly’s magazine that the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments should be repealed. 292 As William Forbath has pointed
out, leading Progressives like John Dewey thought that constitutional rights “seemed destined to ossify
into impediments to practical change” and were “exactly what the laissez-faire jurists insisted: a limit on
democracy’s capacity to reconstruct its social environment by redistributivist means.” 293
2. Progressive Theory. No doubt, these attacks on judicial enforcement of the Constitution and
on the Constitution itself were politically situated. Rightly or wrongly, Progressives believed that
conservative judges stood in the way of reforms they thought best for the country. They therefore had
compelling instrumental reasons delegitimize the basis of judicial power. Tellingly, when control over
the judiciary shifted in the late 1930’s, many Progressives changed their views.
Still, political motivations should not obscure the important contributions that Progressive
intellectuals made to the ongoing debate about constitutionalism. These contributions included worked
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out theories that served to undermine standard defenses of constitutionalism. The theories were as
varied as the disciplines they came from. For example, progressive historians – most prominently
Charles Beard – offered an account of the Constitution’s drafting grounded in the narrow economic
interests of the framers. 294 As Beard himself later conceded, 295 some of his specific claims were
hyperbolic, and most modern scholars think that a purely economic interpretation of the founding is far
too simplistic. Nonetheless, Beard’s more general thesis – that the Constitution was written at least in
part to control and limit popular democracy that threatened important economic interests– has been
widely accepted. 296
Philosophical pragmatists like William James, Charles Peirce, and John Dewey, many of whom
were closely aligned with the Progressive movement, offered important arguments that attacked
constitutionalism’s foundations. 297 Pragmatists held a radical theory of knowledge that rested on social
understanding, rather than correspondence with external truths. 298 What we claimed to know about
the world was always contingently held, experimentally derived, and, as William James famously
insisted, subject to test for its “cash value.” 299 This epistemological view was, to say the least, in deep
tension with the view that a written constitution could or should entrench supposed political truths for
all time.
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The social orientation of Pragmatists also led naturally to a deep skepticism about individual
rights. As David Rabban has written, progressives of this stripe “challenged the idea of natural,
prepolitical rights held by autonomous individuals in isolation from society, associated law and
constitutions with this erroneous conception, and rejected the related position that a laissez-faire
government should do little more than protect individual rights.” 300
This critique was directed primarily against judicial protection for rights of property and
contract, but importantly, leading Pragmatists did not confine their argument to this sphere. For
example, before and during World War I, John Dewey, repeatedly equated all individual liberties with
“privileges based on inequality.” 301 At the height of the War, he caustically attacked not only antiwar
activists but also the civil libertarians who supported them for relying upon “early Victorian platitudes”
about “the sanctity of individual rights and the constitutional guarantees.” 302
Legal scholars associated with American Legal Realism were closely allied with the Pragmatists
and built on Pragmatist insights to advance implicit, and occasionally explicit, attacks on
constitutionalism. Realist scholars shared with Pragmatists a deep skepticism about deriving definite
results from general values like liberty and equality. Even more specific legal rules and precedents could
easily be manipulated to produce a wide variety of results litigated cases. Judges were therefore
inevitably pursuing contestable political or policy agendas when they decided cases. Realists insisted
that these agendas should be discussed openly and not be obscured by claims that judges were
mechanically following the Constitution. 303
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This rule skepticism, distrust of abstractions, and obsession with instrumental rationality
translated easily into criticism of the main tools of constitutionalism. Most realists were convinced that
judges who enforced supposed constitutional guarantees like freedom of contract or protection of
private property were not acting out of constitutional compulsion, but out of a set of deeply contestable
political views that they were foisting on the rest of the country. As Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote in his
celebrated dissent in Lochner v. New York, courts should not decide cases “based upon an economic
theory which a large part of the country does not entertain.” 304 In the same opinion, Holmes, who was
deeply influenced by the Pragmatists and a pioneer of Legal Realism, 305 insisted that “[g]eneral
propositions do not decide concrete cases,” because decisions “depend on a judgment or intuition more
subtle than any articulate major premise.” 306 For Holmes, it followed that there should be a sharply
constrained role for judges enforcing supposed constitutional commands. In particular, judges should
be very reluctant to use the liberty protection of Fourteenth Amendment “to prevent the natural
outcome of a dominant opinion.” 307
Progressive economists like John Commons, Thorstein Veblen, Walton Hamilton, and Robert
Hale, who pioneered an institutional approach, suggested still another line of attack on
constitutionalism. Institutional economists insisted that the “laws” of economics were not autonomous.
Instead, market outcomes depended upon surrounding institutions.
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Harvard-trained economist who spent most of his career at Columbia Law School, offered a more far
reaching critique that held the potential to undermine any sort of constitutional guarantees. 309
In a path-breaking article, Hale brought into question core constitutional dichotomies like the
difference between coercion and freedom or the public and private. 310 As he pointed out, constitutional
law treated government action as presumptively coercive and therefore requiring restraint and private
action as presumptively free and therefore requiring protection. In fact, though, virtually all market
transactions could be characterized as coercive. A worker who accepted low wages and bad working
conditions did so only because the employer was able to threaten him with starvation if he did not
comply. Government nonintervention did not make this worker free; instead, it left him vulnerable to
this private coercion, which the government could alleviate by restructuring the market. It did not
follow, however, that this restructuring would create a world of perfect freedom. If the worker had
more market power, then she could coerce the employer.
The upshot was that the link between constitutional rights and freedom was severed. Because
coercion was everywhere, it was no longer a useful analytic category. One might still favor public
policies based upon their efficacy or upon who was empowered by them, but the goal of achieving
universal freedom, and with it the notion of constitutional rights as a protection for individual
autonomy, dropped out of the picture.
Although Hale himself did not extend his argument, there was no obvious way to limit his
analysis to market “freedoms.” Just as “freedom” of contract permitted employers to coerce workers,
so too, “freedom” of speech, for example, allowed media owners to coerce people who wanted access
to the means of effective communication. Of course, constitutions might still structure political
outcomes, and people who favored certain outcomes would therefore favor the structures that
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produced them. But if one took Hale’s ideas seriously, the historic conception of constitutional law as a
neutral, apolitical protection for human liberty was no longer plausible.
3. The Special Case of Franklin Roosevelt. I know of no evidence that Franklin Roosevelt was
directly influenced by any of the Progressive thinkers discussed above. Unlike his cousin in 1912, the
younger Roosevelt made no reference to constitutional reform in his election campaign of 1932. Unlike
Lincoln and Jefferson, he never confessed to violating the Constitution. Nonetheless his administration
produced a constitutional revolution that shook the foundations of standard constitutionalism.
Although he attended Columbia Law School, the younger Roosevelt was not especially well
versed in constitutional law and seems to have thought little about the subject. 311 Upon assuming
office, however, he quickly became aware of the manner in which constitutional constraints might
impede his effort to deal with the Depression. Roosevelt had little patience with abstractions or
impediments to effective action 312 and, so, little patience with these constraints. His efforts to
overcome them so as to deal with the Depression and then with the War led him to positions that
deviated sharply from standard constitutional doctrine and, ultimately, to an understanding of how
constitutionalism might be refashioned in a nonlegalistic manner.
The saga begins with Roosevelt’s first inaugural address, famous for his declaration that “the
only thing we have to fear is fear itself.” 313 Less famous, but more important to this narrative, was
Roosevelt’s elliptical, but nonetheless unmistakable threat that if Congress did not act, he would assume
extraordinary powers:
Our Constitution is so simple and practical that it is possible always to meet extraordinary needs
by changes in emphasis and arrangement without loss of essential form. . . .
It is to be hoped that the normal balance of executive and legislative authority may be wholly
adequate to meet the unprecedented task before us. But it may be that an unprecedented
311
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demand and need for undelayed action may call for temporary departure from that normal
balance of public procedure.
I am prepared under my constitutional duty to recommend the measures that a stricken nation
in the midst of a stricken world may require. These measures, or such other measures as the
Congress may build out of its experience and wisdom, I shall seek, within my constitutional
authority, to bring to speedy adoption.
But in the event that the Congress shall fail to take one of these two courses, and in the event
that the national emergency is still critical, I shall not evade the clear course of duty that will
then confront me. I shall ask the Congress for the one remaining instrument to meet the crisis—
broad Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that would
be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe. 314
This language is more important for the mindset that it revealed than for any immediate action
that it presaged. In fact, with the possible exception of his arguably illegal executive order declaring a
bank holiday, Roosevelt made no early attempts to upset the basic constitutional structure. A compliant
Congress never put him to the test. 315 The passage nonetheless reveals two crucial aspects of
Roosevelt’s thought: his willingness to depart from widespread assumptions about constitutional limits
when necessary to meet an emergency, and his ability to justify these departures by a rereading of the
Constitution as a “simple and practical” document that did not impose rigid restraints.
Although Roosevelt did not establish the kind of dictatorship that some hoped for and others
feared, there can be no doubt that the early New Deal upset standard conceptions of federalism and
separation of powers. Many New Deal reforms had antecedents in earlier legislation. Still, when taken
together, nothing in our constitutional experience rivaled them. Never before had the national
government assumed such comprehensive power over the economy, and never before had Congress
delegated so much authority and discretion to the executive branch.
Not surprisingly, these measures elicited constitutional challenge. In meeting that challenge,
Roosevelt never expressly asserted his right to violate the Constitution. Indeed, he often asserted his
reverence for the document. But that reverence was based on an idiosyncratic reading of it that
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combined a departmentalist assertion of his independent authority to interpret the Constitution with a
substantive interpretation that eliminated virtually all occasions for violation.
Roosevelt’s departmentalism was reflected in decisions made from the beginning to the end of
his presidency. Early on, when it appeared that the Supreme Court might invalidate legislation that
altered contracts providing for payment in gold, he made plans, never executed because the Court
upheld the legislation, to utilize extraordinary measures that would circumvent the Court’s decision. 316
Later, when the Court did invalidate some important New Deal programs and threatened to
invalidate more of them, Roosevelt considered and ultimately decided against the remedy of
constitutional amendment. He seems to have rejected this course in part because he insisted on the
correctness of his own interpretation of the Constitution under which no amendment was necessary.
Instead, he sought to discipline the Court by increasing its size. At first, he disingenuously argued for
Court packing on the ground that it was necessary to relieve the workload of superannuated justices,
but eventually he acknowledged what was obvious to everyone – that the legislation was designed to
privilege his own constitutional interpretation over the views of the judiciary. 317
Roosevelt’s court-packing plan failed, but he ultimately managed to transform the Court
through the power of appointment. But even after the Court was populated by justices he himself had
appointed, Roosevelt continued to insist on his independent right to interpret the Constitution. When
German saboteurs were caught on American territory during World War II, Roosevelt arranged for the
men to be tried before a hastily convened military commission. He also made clear that he would
adhere to these procedures no matter what a court said. As Attorney General Francis Biddle later
recounted, he announced that ““I want one thing clearly understood, Francis. I won't give them up . . . I
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won't hand them over to any United States marshal armed with a writ of habeas corpus.
Understand?” 318 Faced with the prospect of being ignored, the Supreme Court caved. It announced a
per curiam decision upholding Roosevelt’s actions the day after oral argument, and did not get around
to releasing its opinion in the case until after the men had been executed. 319
Roosevelt’s substantive view of the Constitution was unorthodox to say the least. Broadly
speaking, there were two branches to his thinking: a rejection of technical, constitutional limitations on
government power, and an embrace of affirmative rights. His first inaugural briefly invoked the first
view when he spoke of the Constitution as a “simple and practical” document. 320 He argued for this
position in more detail in his Constitution Day speech of 1937, one of the greatest yet least remembered
major speeches of his Presidency.
The speech came in the immediate wake of the defeat of his Court packing plan and on the one
hundred fiftieth anniversary of the Constitution. Speaking to a huge throng from the base of the
Washington Monument, 321 Roosevelt declared that “[t]he men who wrote the Constitution were the
men who fought the Revolution [who] had watched a weak emergency government almost lose the
war.” 322 They created “a layman’s document” he insisted “not a lawyer’s contract.” 323 It “cannot be
stressed too often,” he claimed, that “Madison, most responsible for it, was not a lawyer, nor was
Washington or Franklin, whose sense of the give-and-take of life had kept the Convention together.”
The Constitution, therefore was a “charter of general principles, completely different from the
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‘whereases’ and the ‘parties of the first part’ and the fine print which lawyers put into leases and
insurance policies and installment agreements.” 324
It naturally followed from this conception of the Constitution that the Supreme Court should not
have the last word in enforcing it. “Contrary to the belief of many Americans, the Constitution says
nothing about any power of the Court to declare legislation unconstitutional.” Instead, “[a]gain and
again the Convention voted down proposals to give the Justices of the Court a veto over legislation.” 325
Roosevelt saw himself as participating in the latest skirmish in a one hundred fifty year-old battle
between “those who would preserve the original broad concept of the Constitution as a layman’s
instrument of government” and the judges and lawyers “who would shrivel the Constitution into a
lawyer’s contract.” Ultimately, he insisted, the American people would be victorious over “those who
professionally or politically talk and think in purely legalistic phrases” and “cry ‘unconstitutional’ at every
effort to better the conditions of our people.” 326
Superficially, these assertions look like claims about how the Constitution should be read, rather
arguments for why it should be disobeyed. Once again, however, the line between constitutional
interpretation and constitutional defiance is indistinct. A constitution that is not “legalistic,” that
contains only broad principles to structure discussion, and that is flexible enough to meet current needs
(according to whom?) need not be disobeyed. This reading of constitutional text turns Realist rule
skepticism into a self-fulfilling prophesy. Roosevelt’s simple and flexible constitution was open-ended
enough to support whatever he wanted to accomplish, especially when it was yoked to a decentralized
system of enforcement that deprived courts of final interpretive authority.
For just this reason, Roosevelt saw no contradiction between constitutional obligation on the
one hand and revolutionizing American government on the other. His constitution was capacious
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enough to support not only pervasive national regulation of the American economy and the creation of
the administrative state, but also the internment of Japanese Americans 327 and prosecution of
dissenters against the War. 328
The second branch of Roosevelt’s theory of the Constitution flipped the historic association
between constitutionalism and negative rights. Drawing on a generation of Progressive thought,
Roosevelt argued that the Constitution required the subordination of the private sphere to government
regulation, rather than the protection of the private sphere from government overreaching.
Focus on Roosevelt’s battle with the Supreme Court has tended to obscure this truly radical
branch of New Deal jurisprudence. The argument over the constitutional validity of the New Deal
turned on the extent of the political branches’ discretionary power, and Roosevelt’s ultimate victory
loosened constitutional constraints. But Roosevelt was not satisfied with merely discretionary power.
He argued that the Constitution compelled government intervention – the very thing that, the
Constitution was conventionally interpreted to prohibit.
There were hints of this position going back to his original 1932 campaign, 329 but Roosevelt
spelled out his theory most clearly when he proposed a “second bill of rights” in a speech to Congress in
early 1944. 330 In his view, the first Bill of Rights had “proved inadequate to assure us equality in the
pursuit of happiness.” This was so because “true individual freedom cannot exist without economic
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security and independence.” Accordingly, the country needed a new bill of rights which included the
right to “a useful and remunerative job,” the right to “earn enough to provide adequate food and
clothing and recreation,” the right to “a decent home” the right to “a good education,” and the right to
“adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health.” 331
There is an obvious tension between these two branches of Roosevelt’s constitutional
jurisprudence. If the Constitution was not a legally enforceable document, how did it create a legal right
to the positive goods that Roosevelt listed? The tension is lessened, although not completely resolved,
by the fact that this second Bill of Rights was, apparently, to be implemented by legislation rather than
judicial decree. 332 By labeling them a “Bill of Rights,” Roosevelt seemed to imply that Congress was
under an obligation to enact the measures he proposed. But by remitting the question to the political
sphere, he emphasized yet again that for him constitutional “rights” were a starting point for political
negotiation, not fixed and inflexible legal commands.
The more serious tension, though, is between the second Bill of Rights and the standard tools of
constitutional analysis. That analysis treated private markets as a baseline closely associated with
individual liberty. On this view, speech was free so long as Congress made no laws, and the people were
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects so long as the government conducted no
unreasonable searches and seizures.
Roosevelt’s second Bill of Rights dissolved this link and, so, left constitutional law without
grounding from which rights deprivations could be measured. If true constitutional freedom required
not just the protection from government but also the protection of government, then how were we to
evaluate government coercion that increased the freedom of some by depriving others of freedom? On
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a view like this, the internment of Japanese Americans or suppression of wartime dissent might be not
just constitutionally permissible, but actually constitutionally mandatory if they were necessary to
vindicate the positive right to government protection.
Moreover, once the link between the private sphere and freedom was severed, “rights” could
no longer be treated as absolutes. There were inevitably rights on both sides of the ledger.
Enforcement of rights meant balancing some claims against others. Balancing, in turn, requires
assigning relative values to the claims to be balanced against each other. Because these values are not
specified in the Constitution, the process of value assignment is inevitably political rather than legal.
Roosevelt succeeded in remaking the Supreme Court and opening the discretionary space for
economic regulation, but the truly radical implications of his constitutional thought and, more broadly,
the general Progressive critique of constitutionalism, never gained a firm foothold. By the time he spoke
in 1944, Progressive skepticism was already beginning to fall into disrepute. The rise of fascism in
Europe gave a different cultural meaning to claims that law reflected no more than power, 333 and the
repopulation of the Supreme Court with Roosevelt-appointed judges made Progressives themselves
more at ease with judicial enforcement of constitutional norms. Moreover, the formation of a New Deal
coalition that included racial, religious, and political minorities turned support for civil rights and civil
liberties protections into a political necessity.
The upshot was the Carolene Products settlement under which the recently empowered
Roosevelt justices distinguished sharply between property rights, indefensibly privileged by the so-called
Lochner court, and civil and political rights, justifiably privileged by the new, and newly-enlightened
Roosevelt Court. 334 The settlement ultimately proved unstable because, as an earlier generation of
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Progressives understood, both civil and political rights on the one hand and property and contract rights
on the other depended on the specification of a baseline formed by market transactions. 335 Eventually,
the settlement unraveled. Before it did, however, it laid the groundwork for the emergence of the
Warren Court and the brief flourishing of a moderate-left version of constitutionalism.
E. The Warren Court
Mid-twentieth century constitutionalism provides support for both constitutionalists and
constitutional skeptics. Some commentators remain nostalgic for the Court that gave us Brown, 336
Miranda, 337 and Reynolds 338 and believe that its achievements demonstrate the unrealized possibilities
of liberal constitutionalism. 339 But the more dominant modern view is that the Warren Court’s obvious
failures serve as a cautionary tale about the limits of judicially centered constitutional power. 340 On this
view, the Court’s history is part of a narrative that emphasizes what Mark Tushnet has aptly called the
chastening of constitutional aspiration. 341
1. The Civil Rights Revolution. The struggle over the Second Reconstruction offered a replay of
the fusion of constitutional and anticonstitutional rhetoric that marked the antebellum period. Both
sides used standard constitutional tools to advance their positions, but, when necessary, both sides also
resorted to tactics and arguments that challenged constitutional norms.
The efforts of southern opponents of racial equality were less interesting because less original.
Instead of developing new constitutional theories, they recycled old ones. Nullification, interposition,
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and states’ rights made new appearances, and John Calhoun’s theoretical musings gained new
popularity. Once again, these arguments were supplemented with extraconstitutional rhetoric and
actions. While lawyers made sophisticated legal arguments in court, thugs coupled revolutionary
rhetoric with violence in the streets. 342
In contrast, opponents of racial segregation pioneered new legal and extralegal tactics, 343 but
the division between and paradoxical conjunction of constitutional and skeptical arguments was not
new at all. The division is neatly if over simply personified by the rivalry between Thurgood Marshall
and Martin Luther King. Marshall led a legal campaign insisting on respect for the rule of law. Like
Marshall, King grounded his arguments in constitutional rhetoric, but he deemphasized detailed legal
argument before courts. Instead, he pursued a strategy of civil disobedience and direct action. 344 Even
a half century later, historians argue about which strategy was more successful. The ambiguity is
symbolized by the Montgomery bus boycott. King’s leadership of the boycott galvanized advocates of
civil rights across the country, but the boycott came to a successful conclusion only after Marshall
secured a holding from the Supreme Court that segregated public transportation was
unconstitutional. 345
Doubtless both Marshall and King contributed to the change in public attitudes that ultimately
produced change on the ground. Importantly, however, when the change finally came, it was not the
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direct product of the judicial constitutionalism of the 1950s. Instead, it came about because of political
changes that culminated in the Johnson administration’s forceful support for civil rights in the 1960s. 346
The question of causation is made still more complicated by the fact that neither King nor
Marshall drew a sharp distinction between legal and political struggle. King pursued the struggle in the
streets, but, like many before him, he linked constitutional and natural rights rhetoric. 347 Moreover, as
the Montgomery example illustrates, he sometimes depended on legal intervention to sustain the
movement. Marshall pursued victories in court, but clearly understood that the litigation campaign was
a tool for political mobilization. 348
Importantly, the Warren Court itself also straddles the divide between our constitutional and
skeptical traditions. On the one hand, Brown constitutes a remarkable reformulation of constitutional
law to advance the cause of racial liberation. On the other, there is evidence that at least some of the
justices voted for the result out of moral and political conviction, rather than because they thought it
was legally justified. 349 That fact is hardly surprising given the shaky support for the result in standard
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constitutional materials. Brown was almost certainly inconsistent with the original expected application
of the fourteenth amendment and with decades of precedent. 350 Instead of utilizing the usual tools of
constitutional analysis, 351 Chief Justice Warren relied upon social science evidence of dubious relevance
and reliability. 352
Moreover, even if Brown, itself, can be constitutionally justified, the Court’s other decisions
around the same period fit more easily within the skeptical tradition. On the same day that Brown was
decided, the Court held that segregation in the District of Columbia violated the fifth amendment’s due
process clause despite the fact that the clause was written at a time when it was reasonably clear that
the Constitution protected slavery. 353 The justice’s conference notes make clear that Brown II’s “all
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deliberate speed” equivocation was the result of a political compromise dictated by the felt need to
avoid violent resistance, rather than by constitutional law. 354 Brown had announced that school
segregation was unconstitutional because of the special role of education and because of its effects on
the hearts and minds of school children, 355 but, to the dismay of constitutionalists, 356 the Court, without
explanation, announced that the same rule applied in contexts that had nothing to do with children or
education. 357 When the Court was faced with a challenge to anti-miscegenation laws in the immediate
wake of Brown, it disposed of the case in a manner that most commentators consider lawless. 358
Internal materials regarding the justices’ deliberations make clear that that its actions were motivated
by the desire not to intensify southern resistance rather than by constitutional fidelity. 359
All of these decisions suggest that the justices saw their role as political rather than legal. Of
course, when the Constitution served their purposes, they used constitutional rhetoric. It does not
follow, though, that the justices were ultimately motivated by constitutional obedience. When
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constitutional obligation got in the way, they exhibited a remarkable readiness to override legal
constraints.
2. The Warren Court’s legacy. In addition to its support for civil rights, the Warren Court
revolutionized criminal procedure, 360 significantly expanded free speech protections, 361 provided
important guarantees for voting rights, 362 and took tentative first steps toward providing constitutional
protection for the poor. 363 If one includes the early years of the Burger Court in the historical reckoning,
then the protection of reproductive rights 364 and guarantees of gender equality 365 should be added to
the list of accomplishments.
Commentators argued then, and continue to argue now, about the extent to which these
decisions were manifestations of constitutional fidelity. Even on the assumption that they were,
though, the more important question for present purposes is what the relationship is between the
Warren Court experience and the skeptical tradition. On the one hand, it might be argued that the
Warren Court experience demonstrates that judicially enforced constitutional obligation can serve the
interests of justice and progress. There can be no doubt that the Court used the Constitution to
eradicate the worst forms of racial subjugation. Other Warren era decisions have also shown surprising
resilience. Miranda warnings are now part of our culture, 366 the one-person-one-vote rule remains a

360

See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
361
See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 2534 (1964); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
362
See,e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966).
363
See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.ES. 618 (1969); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
364
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Carey v. Population Services Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
365
See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
366
See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 430 (2000) (reaffirming Miranda and acknowledging that
Miranda warnings “have become part of our national culture”).

88
touchstone in legislative districting, 367 and despite significant erosions in law 368 and practice, 369 the
abortion right remains mostly intact. 370
But there is another side to the story. Writing in the immediate wake of the Warren years,
Alexander Bickel argued that the Court would ultimately be judged by its ability to predict the future.
He thought that the Court had failed to do so, 371 and, now that the future has arrived, it seems that he
was largely correct. The point is not so much that Warren Court precedent has been overruled,
although some of it certainly has been, 372 as that it has become irrelevant. For example, the effort to
end segregated schools was mostly undone by neighborhood school policies superimposed upon
residential segregation. 373 Warren Court criminal procedure reforms failed to prevent historically
unprecedented increases in incarceration rates 374 and a growing racial disproportion in those rates. 375
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Some commentators think that Warren Court decisions have actually worsened these trends. 376
Similarly, the widespread implementation of political gerrymandering has made a mockery of the notion
that one-person-one-vote could produce political fairness. 377 The Court’s hints that economic injustice
might be subject to constitutional attack were stillborn. 378
On a more general level, the Warren Court had at best limited success in convincing the country
that judicial power legitimated by constitutional text dictated broad based social reforms. 379 Today,
many Warren Court decisions seem not so much legally wrong as politically naïve. In this sense,
attitudes toward the Warren Court mirror contemporary views about the 1960s as a whole. Many
contemporary Americans think of the era as marked by well-meaning and even exhilarating efforts to
achieve change, a few of which produced lasting contributions, but many of which backfired or fizzled.
Some of the Warren Court’s difficulties were doctrinal. As heirs of the Progressive tradition, the
justices often used Progressive analytic techniques to advance their constitutional arguments. Since
these techniques were originally developed to criticize constitutionalism, it is not surprising that the fit
between them and the Court’s constitutional agenda was awkward.
For example, many Progressives criticized standard constitutional analysis that celebrated
government neutrality and constraint. They pointed out that standard conceptions of freedom and
coercion were dependent on a baseline formed by government actions that shaped the market.
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Government neutrality overlaid on market outcomes, themselves produced by background legal norms,
empowered some private actors to coerce other private actors. 380
Progressives made these arguments in service of criticizing constitutional decisions, but the
Warren Court tried to build on them to justify these decisions. Most prominently, Brown refused to
accept the facial neutrality of the separate but equal doctrine. Even though both blacks and whites
were equally barred from attending each other’s schools, when the doctrine intersected with a
pervasively racialized social system, it had the effect of producing a racial hierarchy. 381 The Warren
Court thought that the government had an affirmative obligation to eliminate that effect – an obligation
that could not be met by facial neutrality alone. This positive rights orientation became increasingly
apparent as the Court, faced with massive resistance, mandated remedies that required affirmative,
race-conscious efforts to desegregate schools. 382
Some of the Court’s other well-known decisions demonstrate a similar refusal to take market
baselines enforced by common law property allocations as a given. For example, cases like Gideon v.
Wainwright 383 and Douglas v. California 384, guaranteeing a right to counsel in some criminal cases,
imposed an affirmative obligation on the state to provide lawyers to people who lacked the funds to pay
for them. These decisions rejected a facially neutral policy that denied free lawyers to rich and poor
alike in favor of an affirmative duty to relieve at least this disadvantage produced by market allocations.
Similarly, the Court’s public forum cases 385 required governments to provide what amounted to a
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subsidy to speech activities by mandating the free use of public property. New York Times v. Sullivan, 386
which sharply limited common law libel rules, can also be conceptualized as mandating a free speech
subsidy by permitting the press to inflict uncompensated harm on public figures in the interest of
increasing the amount of speech.
The problem for the Court was that, just as some Progressives thought, the abandonment of
common law baselines left constitutional rights untethered from anything that could give them
determinate content. Instead of clear and absolute limits on government power, rights became
questions of degree and subject to balancing.
For example, if the state had an affirmative obligation to desegregate schools, then questions
naturally arose about how much desegregation was required and at what cost? If lawyers had to be
provided to indigent criminal defendants, how skilled did the lawyer have to be? If the first amendment
required a subsidy for speech, how much speech was constitutionally sufficient? These are questions
that cannot be answered by simple fidelity to a constitutional text. They ultimately rest on politically
contestable judgments about the comparative worth of different goods. But if that is all the Court’s
decisions amounted to, why should they not be within the domain of ordinary politics?
It would be foolish, though, to suppose that the Warren Court’s main problem was doctrinal.
Instead, its ultimate failure rested on a political miscalculation. The Justices thought that they could
harness constitutional obligation to produce meaningful social change. They seemed to think that
people would be motivated to do things that they would not otherwise do just because an elite
institution told them that the Constitution required this action. It turned out, though that the rhetoric
of obligation was insufficiently powerful to convince large numbers of people to accept change that they
did not want. Instead, as the political winds shifted and the composition of the Court changed, Warren
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Court interpretations were met with opposing interpretations that mandated different results that were
more popular. 387 The upshot is an experience that strongly reinforces skeptical doubts whether
constitutional law can effectively combat the social, political, economic, and cultural forces that are the
ultimate determinates of public policy.
F. The Modern Period
Today, no revered ex-President defends his own constitutional violations, raises questions about
intergenerational obligation, or argues that Supreme Court decisions should be reversed by popular
referendum. No one of consequence is burning the Constitution or calling it a pact with the devil. A
handful of people well outside the mainstream still advocate secession, but no one takes them seriously.
Instead, we are treated to the spectacle of members of Congress reading the Constitution aloud before
the beginning of a session and of a new requirement that every piece of legislation be accompanied by a
defense of its constitutional validity. 388 Liberals and conservatives alike are fully engaged in
constitutional argument. Even some legal academics associated with the left have embraced
constitutional originalism. 389 At least superficially, it seems that the skeptical tradition has run into a
dead end.
In this Section, I argue that this conclusion is indeed superficial. Skeptical arguments no longer
receive the kind of overt and boisterous support they once did, but one does not have to look very far
beneath the surface to see that constitutional skepticism is nonetheless alive and well.
1. Popular skepticism. The public’s attitude toward constitutionalism is deeply conflicted.
Many Americans profess unquestioning allegiance to the Constitution, 390 and commentators regularly
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make constitutional arguments on all sides of public policy issues. But this seeming devotion to the
Constitution is married to a deep cynicism about the role that constitutional argument actually plays.
The cynicism finds clear expression in the media’s regular identification of judges and justices with
reference to the party of the president who appointed them. It is on full display at judicial confirmation
hearings, which have turned into undisguised political warfare. 391 According to polling data, most
Americans believe that political considerations play at least some role in Supreme Court decision
making. 392 It escapes almost no one’s attention that politicians regularly use constitutional arguments
about, for example, health care, crime prevention, and voting rights to support conclusions that they
would come to anyway.
This combination of outward devotion to the rhetoric and rituals of constitutionalism with inner
doubt and despair is bound to be unstable. The situation is made only worse by the Supreme Court’s
own ambivalence. Consider, for example, two recent decisions exhibiting the two, rival forms of
constitutional analysis currently in vogue. In District of Columbia v. Heller, 393 both sides conspicuously
deployed originalist methodology. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, found that the original public
meaning of the second amendment made the District’s gun control statute unconstitutional. Justice
Stevens, using the same techniques, found that the original public meaning of the amendment was
consistent with the statute. 394 Both justices filled scores of pages of the United States Reports with
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detailed analysis of the linguistic structure, dictionary meanings, and popular contemporary
understanding of the amendment. Remarkably the upshot was a near standoff. Five justices thought
that the statute was clearly inconsistent with the amendment, while four justices thought that it was
clearly not.
Of course, all methods of analysis produce disagreement, but two additional facts about the
Court’s performance make the outcome in Heller especially troubling. First, the difference of opinion
over supposedly apolitical matters like semantics and dictionary meaning precisely tracked the
ideological differences on the Court. Somehow, all five of the conservative justices read the amendment
one way, while all four of the liberal justices read the same language the other way.
Second, virtually all of what the Justices on both sides of the question wrote was deeply
irrelevant to the important public policy question that ought to concern us. Gun control poses hard
questions about which reasonable people can disagree. Does any sensible person suppose that these
questions should be answered by determining what some people thought over two centuries ago in a
society that was radically different in culture, technology, and geography?
Many people who think that this is not a sensible way to decide questions like this adhere to the
“living constitution” theory of interpretation. On this view, judges should not be limited by the original
understanding of constitutional language, but instead should strive to give it modern meaning. 395
Although Justice Kennedy did not identify it as such, he used this approach in United States v.
Windsor, 396 where he wrote for the Court to invalidate the Defense of Marriage Act. 397 Justice
Kennedy’s opinion made no effort to uncover the original meaning of constitutional text or the specific
intent of its framers. Indeed, he barely identified the text he relied upon. Instead, his opinion
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consisted of an extended sermon on the virtues of tolerance and respect for individuals.
In their angry dissenting opinions, Justices Scalia and Alito were entirely correct in pointing out
that Kennedy’s opinion rested on an implicit, nonconstitutional moral premise – that gay sex and
marriage were, at worst, morally neutral and at best an important means of human expression. 398 One
might suppose from this attack that the conservatives stood for principled neutrality in what Justice
Scalia has referred to as our “culture war.” 399 Unfortunately for them, however, their own votes and
opinions in racial affirmative action cases rest on a similarly contestable moral premise. Like Kennedy’s
opinion in Heller, the opinions written by conservatives in cases about so-called racial preferences never
investigate original public meaning. Instead, they rest exclusively on moral and sociological judgments
about the supposed evil of racial categorization. 400
Hypocrisy of this sort is too obvious to miss. Nor does it require deep analysis to discover that
the votes in Windsor and in affirmative action cases once again precisely track the Court’s political
divisions. Given these facts, it is not surprising that that many members of the general public have
difficulty taking the Court’s constitutional pretensions seriously. 401 Perhaps more important, though, a
surprisingly large number of Americans think that it is a good thing when the Court does not decide
cases based solely upon the Constitution. For example, a CBS News Poll conducted in 2013 asked
respondents whether, when the Supreme Court decides an important constitution case, it should
consider only the legal issue or also “what a majority of the public thinks about the issue.” Forty-six
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percent of respondents thought that the justices should confine themselves to the legal issue, but 45%
thought that they should also consider public opinion . 402 According to another poll, although 69% of
respondents agreed with the statement that “The United States Constitution is an enduring document
that remains relevant today,” 28% rejected the statement and agreed, instead, with the view that “[t]he
United States Constitution is an outdated document that needs to be modernized.” 403
2. Academic skepticism. Virtually all modern scholars of constitutional law begin with some
kind of commitment to constitutional fidelity. Only a tiny handful of legal academics overtly raise
questions about constitutional obligation. 404 But despite this fact, constitutional skepticism plays a
central role in contemporary constitutional scholarship.
Sometimes, it shows up in quite surprising places. Consider, for example, the “Constitution in
exile” movement. Some conservative judges and scholars have argued that much of modern
government, including the entire apparatus of the administrative state, violates the Constitution. 405 Of
course, their fervent complaints about this state of affairs are grounded in constitutional fidelity. If one
looks beneath the surface however, their argument also supports the skeptical position. After all, if it is
really true that for years, broad swaths of legal doctrine have been infected by blatant constitutional
violation, then it cannot also be true that constitutional obedience plays a central role in maintaining the
stability of our government and culture. In a backhanded way, the claims of the “Constitution in exile”
proponents support the skeptical argument that constitutional obedience is unnecessary to hold the
country together.
Moreover, if the “Constitution in exile” proponents are correct, we are faced with the daunting
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question of what to do about it. Return to original constitutional understandings might, among other
things permit the revival of overt gender discrimination, 406 and allow states to outlaw interracial
marriage. 407 A few diehards are prepared to accept this and more, but even most originalists find these
outcomes too much to swallow. Accordingly, they avoid these results with transparent dodges like
reliance on stare decisis or on the same sort of tendentious, result-driven arguments that they (rightly)
accuse their opponents of using. In obvious ways, the use of both techniques supports the skeptical
position.
Other conservative judges and academics are much more straight forward in endorsing aspects
of constitutional skepticism. For example, natural law advocates like Hadley Arkes reject the proposition
that we should rely on the Constitution if it is not supported by sound moral principles. 408 Richard
Posner, perhaps the best known lower federal court judge in the country and once the darling of
conservatives, maintains that the United States Supreme Court is political in its orientation and denies
that constitutional law, at least as conventionally understood, explains or justifies what judges do. 409 J.
Harvie Wilkinson, another distinguished conservative jurist, purports to disagree with Posner but
apparently shares his view that no theory of constitutional law is satisfactory. 410 In a series of important
works, Adrian Vermeule has advanced sophisticated arguments against use of the conventional tools of
constitutional adjudication. 411

406

See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments, 1979
WASH. U. L. Q. 161, 161-63 (“Boldly dynamic interpretation, departing radically from the original understanding is
required to tie the fourteenth amendment’s equal protection clause to a command that government treat men
and women as individuals equal in rights, responsibilities, and opportunities.”) But see Steven G. Calabresi & Julia
Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2011).
407
See, e.g., Ronald Turner, Were Separate-But-Equal and Antimiscegnation Laws Constitutional? Applying
Scalian Traditionalism to Brown and Loving, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 285 (2003).
408
See HADLEY ARKES, BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION (1990).
409
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2005).
410
See J. HARVIE WILKINSON, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO
SELF-GOVERNANCE (2012).
411
See, e.g., Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Originalism and Emergencies: A Reply to Lawson, 87 B.U. L. REV.
313 (2007) (arguing against reliance on originalism to determine scope of executive power in emergencies); Adrian

98
Scholars on the left are, if anything, even more receptive to skeptical positions. For example, in
academics associated with Critical Legal Studies, including Mark Tushnet, 412 Duncan Kennedy, 413 and
Peter Gabel 414 have attacked the very concept of constitutional rights. More recently, Tushnet, 415
together with Larry Kramer 416 and Jeremy Waldron 417 have argued against the assumption that judges
should enforce the Constitution. Tushnet has coupled this attack with an endorsement of a “thin” 418 –
some would say anorexic 419 – constitution limited to the ideals expressed in the Constitution’s preamble
and the Bill of Rights. In two important books, 420 Sanford Levinson has written in detail about the
Constitution’s many deficiencies and called for a new constitutional convention to correct them. Bruce
Ackerman 421 and his colleague Akhil Amar 422 have argued that the Constitution can be and has been
changed outside the formal amendment process. Mark Graber 423 and J.M. Balkin 424 have written more
generally about the problem of “constitutional evil.” Girardeau Spann has argued that constitutional
judicial review systematically harms racial minorities, 425 and Gary Peller has attacked the standard
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integrationist view, which dominates constitutional treatments of race. 426 Their colleague, Robin West,
has maintained that constitutionalism, especially when associated with judicial review, stunts moral
imagination. 427
Finally, scholars not closely associated with either the left or the right have seized on a variety of
skeptical arguments. For example, Michael Klarman 428 and Gerald Rosenberg429 have both shown that
judicial enforcement of constitutional text has been relatively unimportant in producing social change.
Barry Friedman has demonstrated that constitutional decisions by judges usually conform to public
opinion. 430 Daryl Levinson has argued that constitutional obligation plays an unimportant role in
preventing political actors from abusing their power. 431 Cass Sunstein has defended a “judicial
minimalism” grounded in a deep distrust of constitutional litigation as a means of achieving broad scale
social justice. 432
In short, reports of the death of constitutional skepticism are greatly exaggerated. Of course,
every generation refashions skeptical arguments to suit its own needs, just as every generation has its
own version of constitutionalism. The skepticism of early twenty-first century America is not the same
as the skepticism of the Founders, or of the antebellum period, or of the Progressives. Yet amidst all of
the celebration of the American Constitution and denigration of its critics, something identifiable as a
skeptical tradition connected to crucial political events throughout our history continues to survive and
flourish.
II. Disaggregating and Reintegrating the Varieties of Skepticism
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As the last Part demonstrates, at one time or another, a large number of scholars and politicians
have endorsed constitutional skepticism. It has been a feature of some of the most important political
movements of our history and has fueled arguments of both the right and the left. It might nonetheless
be thought that this history exaggerates the influence of the skeptical argument because there is not
really a single skeptical position, but, instead, a variety of quite different views misleadingly grouped
under a single rubric.
One response to this criticism is to point out that the mainstream constitutional tradition is
similarly fragmented. People who label themselves constitutionalists also believe a wide variety of
different things, not all of which are consistent with each other. Respect for constitutional text
(interpreted in a variety of inconsistent ways 433), for judicial decisions whether faithful to text or not, 434
for various versions of tradition, 435 and for philosophical understandings, 436 all pass for constitutional
commitment. 437 If we do not expect unity from constitutionalism’s defenders, there is no reason to
expect unity from its opponents.
Perhaps this is answer enough, but in this Part, I nonetheless explore the question whether the
various skeptical arguments I have discussed in Part I have a common core. In Section A, I separate out
the various strands of skepticism. Section B argues that that these strands do indeed have something in
common and that they are connected to a deeply American belief in the possibility of right answers to
moral and political questions.
433
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A. Varieties of Skepticism
In this section, I attempt to disentangle the various strands of skepticism while simultaneously
offering the beginnings of a defense for each variety.
1. Constitutional Evil.

The starting point for most skeptical arguments is a perceived gap

between constitutional commands on the one hand and some other source of normative authority on
the other. If a constitution, or a particular provision in a constitution, is evil, why should anyone obey
it? 438 The argument that one shouldn’t was made most persuasively and directly by antebellum
abolitionists. If constitutional protection for slavery was indeed a pact with the devil, why adhere to
it? 439
A believer in constitutionalism might respond that skeptics should not be so doctrinaire. I might
believe that a particular provision is evil but still choose to obey on the grounds that most other people
believe it to be good. After all, how can I be so sure that I am right and they are wrong? 440
Unfortunately, though, normative humility does not solve the problem of constitutional evil. Of
course, people should be open-minded and wonder about the rightness of their own judgments when
many others disagree. Initial judgments should be corrected to account for these and other facts. But
the question remains: why should I obey a constitutional provision when it conflicts with my corrected
judgment?
At first, one might think that constitutional evil poses a problem only if the constitution is in fact
evil. If the constitution is not evil, or if it is more good than evil, or if it is more good than the likely
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alternatives, then, one might think, the problem does not arise. It turns out, though, that at least on the
conceptual level, constitutional evil creates a problem for even good constitutions.
The problem reemerges when one focuses on what it means to “obey” a constitution. Acceding
to a constitutional provision because of accidental overlap between the provision and a binding norm is
not obedience. No one would say that Orthodox Jews are obeying Koranic law when they refuse to eat
pork or that Americans who abstain from armed robbery are obeying the laws of Finland, even if Finland
asserts universal jurisdiction for its laws. In order for authentic obedience to take hold, the command in
question must make a difference. If the command does no work – if one would engage in the same
conduct whether or not the command existed – then the need for obedience simply does not arise.
It follows that constitutional evil is a problem for even the good constitution. It is true that if
one believes that a constitution is good, one need not lose sleep over whether to follow its terms. But
following those terms is only contingent. If an independent belief in the goodness of constitutional
provisions is the only ground that supports a duty to comply, then the duty will disappear whenever one
disagrees with what the constitution says. Moreover, even if a lucky individual happens to live in a
jurisdiction where there is no gap between a constitution and other commitments, there remains the
difficulty of what stance to take toward others who disagree with constitutional provisions. How can I in
good faith insist that you must obey provisions that you find odious when my own compliance is
contingent on my substantive agreement with the provisions?
For similar reasons, this understanding of obedience undermines the common observation that,
despite some bad provisions, the good in the United States Constitution outweighs the bad. Perhaps it
does, but that observation does not explain why we should not adhere to the good provisions while
ignoring the bad. Maybe selective obedience is impossible because the Constitution is somehow a
package deal. Still, acceptance of the package is again contingent on a belief based on nonconstitutional
norms that the good outweighs the bad. Following a constitution in these circumstances rests not on
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obedience, but on a contingent overlap between constitutional commands, taken as a whole, and one’s
nonconstitutional conception of the good. A test for authentic obedience arises only when the balance
is struck the other way. People who reject constitutional skepticism must explain why in these
circumstances, we should adhere to constitutional commands.
A more promising solution plays off the similarity between the problem of constitutional
obligation and the more general problem of political obligation. Of course, constitutions can be evil and,
obviously, when they are, political theory faces difficult dilemmas. But ordinary law can also be evil, and
theorists over several millennia have struggled with the problem of general political obligation. It comes
as no surprise that an anarchist who believes that all these efforts have been unsuccessful will also be a
constitutional skeptic. But most people are not anarchists. The challenge for nonanarchist who are also
constitutional skeptics is to explain why constitutional obligation is especially problematic. Put
differently, they must explain why constitutions are different from ordinary law. The next section
provides one answer to that challenge.
2. The dead hand problem. One difference between constitutions and ordinary law is that
constitutions tend to be more entrenched against change. Perhaps comparative entrenchment is not a
conceptually necessary feature of constitutions, but it is at least empirically associated with them. As it
happens, the association is especially important in the United States, which has the most entrenched
national constitution in the world. 441
Entrenchment raises skeptical doubts about why a society should feel bound by decisions made
long ago. Even if ordinary laws should be obeyed, why obey judgments that are relatively immune to
change? This version of skepticism consists of two, related worries. First, constitutions that are old are
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bound to have provisions that fit poorly with current social and technological realities. It is far from
clear that decisions about, say, privacy, press freedoms, or guns made hundreds of years ago in a small,
mostly rural republic that had never heard of television, the internet, or semiautomatic weapons also
make sense today. Progressives, writing in the wake of the industrial revolution repeatedly pressed a
version of this argument, 442 as did Franklin Roosevelt when he complained that the Supreme Court was
enforcing a “horse and buggy” version of the Constitution. 443
Second, entrenchment raises questions about democratic legitimacy. Why should people long
dead “outvote” people alive now who should have the right live their own lives? As we have seen, this
was the problem that preoccupied, Hume, 444 Paine, 445 and, especially, Jefferson. 446 Constitutions are
often defended as acts of political autonomy. Skeptics argue that the autonomy of dead generations
comes at the price of subservience of living generations.
One response to both branches of the argument is that entrenchment derives not from ancient
command but from present choice. Modern Americans are not forced, kicking and screaming as it were,
to follow constitutional commands. After all, the Framers have no actual power over us. We obey the
Constitution because we have made a current choice to obey.
On reflection, however, this response dissolves into arguments that have already been
addressed. If one means by it that Americans today obey the Constitution only because they believe
that it is substantively good, then, for reasons discussed above, they are not engaged in authentic
obedience. Perhaps instead, the point is, that, whether rightly or wrongly, modern Americans simply
think that they have a duty to accede to what the Framers wrote even when they disagree with it. But if
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this is all the argument amounts to, then the position engages rather than refutes the skeptical
tradition. Skeptics will respond that before making a decision to blindly obey, Americans need to think
about the skeptical arguments against doing so. It makes no sense to short circuit a discussion about
skepticism with the bare assertion that people presently reject it.
Finally, a constitutionalist might respond that Americans who disagree with some constitutional
provisions nonetheless feel bound to them because political community must exist over time, and our
constitutional tradition defines who we are as a nation. 447 But this assertion merely raises the central
issue to which this Article is addressed. Assuming arguendo that the point about political communities
is correct, we nonetheless need to decide how to define our political tradition. The burden of my
argument is that skepticism offers an attractive alternative to the standard story.
It turns out, then, that entrenchment poses a serious problem for constitutionalists and
provides a reason why people who accept general political obligation might nonetheless reject
constitutional obligation. Of course, it is true that ordinary statutes are also entrenched to some extent.
No sane government could operate under a system where laws expired as soon as they were enacted.
The need for planning, settlement, and certainty have some claim upon us, and it would be wildly
inefficient – in fact, impossible – to constantly rethink every political decision we have made.
But this fact demonstrates only that the distinction between statutes and constitutions is a
matter of degree rather than kind. So long as constitutions are relatively entrenched when compared to
ordinary law, then, skeptics insist, constitutionalists must justify the extra margin of entrenchment. Put
differently, our ordinary laws should strike the right balance between stability and change.
Constitutionalists must explain why the ordinary balance is inappropriate in the case of constitutional
provisions.
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3. Indeterminacy. Of course, entrenchment would hardly matter if the entrenched provisions
did not bind us to anything. One way to understand the claims made by eighteenth century American
constitutionalists 448 and by Franklin Roosevelt almost two hundred years later 449 is that the
constitutional commands are deeply indeterminate. Perhaps they set out fixed ideals or general goals,
but the ideals and goals are so vague that they can only structure discussions, not dictate outcomes.
The indeterminacy point is double edged. On the one hand, American Legal Realists utilized it as
a skeptical cudgel against rule-of-law conservatives. They argued that the decisions of Lochner era
judges were not a scientific and logical explication of clear rules. Instead, they were manifestations of
regressive political choices that, because they could not be honestly defended, were obfuscated by legal
rhetoric. 450 Critical Legal Studies has made the same point in our own time. 451
On the other hand, indeterminacy also provides a kind of defense against skeptical accusations.
How can the Constitution possibly be evil if it allows us to do whatever we want? In what sense are we
bound by the Framers’ dead hand if their language is infinitely plastic?
Skeptics can offer a layered response to constitutionalist cooptation of the indeterminacy
argument. First, some provisions of the Constitution are not indeterminate. The text is clear that the
President does not have a life-time appointment and that measures passed by the Russian Parliament
are not thereby the laws of the United States. These particular examples of textual clarity hardly
matter, but other provisions – for example entrenching representation in the Senate that is wildly
disproportionate or allowing a President to be elected while losing the popular vote – are quite
consequential.
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A thoroughgoing believer in the indeterminacy thesis might deny that even these results are
inevitable. A clever enough lawyer, she will insist, can get around any constitutional language. Perhaps,
for example, equal protection principles as applied to the federal government through the fifth
amendment’s due process clause 452 outlaw both our system of Senate representation and the Electoral
College. 453
This point is undoubtedly correct as a conceptual matter. All language is conventional. Given
sufficient change in cultural assumptions, the meaning of words can change dramatically. But although
accurate as far as it goes, the point ignores the fact that language has undeniable meaning once one
specifies a surrounding culture. It is simply a fact that despite theoretical linguistic underspecification,
people effortless understand which interpretations make sense and which do not. I would not write this
article but for the hope that others will understand what I mean, and judges and other decision makers
unquestionably sometimes have the internal experience of feeling bound by legal language. 454 The fact
that these understandings are not built into the internal structure of language -- and even the fact that
they may be conditioned by exercises of social power -- does not undermine this point. For whatever
reason, words sometimes bridge the gap between persons.
All this suggests that the indeterminacy thesis, at least in its extreme and global form, is
incorrect. But if the thesis is wrong, how can it be part of a skeptical critique? Here we come to the
second layer of the skeptical argument. Of course, some constitutional language is relatively
determinate, but other language is quite indeterminate. At least given today’s culture, we think we
know what it means when the Constitution says that each state shall be represented by two senators,
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but it is anybody’s guess what constitutes “equal protection of the laws” or a “Republican form of
Government.” 455 The problem, then, is this: to the extent that Constitutional language is determinate,
we confront the constitutional evil and dead hand problems. To the extent that it is indeterminate, we
confront the problem of who will have the final authority to declare its meaning.
Moreover, whatever body is given this authority is bound to exaggerate the size of the
determinacy domain. This tendency is built into the very structure of constitutional obligation. Because
the legitimacy of the decision maker rests on constitutional obligation, the decision maker cannot admit
that the decisions are based on nonconstitutional considerations. The result is a kind of systematic
misrepresentation. Just as the Legal Realists claimed, people who believe in constitutional obligation
are tricked into acceding to commands that are not really dictated by the Constitution.
4. Judicial Supremacy. On the conventional view, Justices of the United States Supreme Court
have final interpretive authority. 456 Many skeptics throughout our history, including Jefferson, Lincoln,
and Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt, have rejected this axiom. 457 Oddly, though, it takes some work to
explain why the axiom is part of the skeptical tradition at all.
There are two reasons why the case against judicial supremacy fits uneasily within the skeptical
tradition. First, whatever its other problems, judicial supremacy does not contribute to the dead hand
or constitutional evil difficulties. If judges did not enforce the Constitution, and if we are not to give up
altogether on constitutional obligation, then constitutional commands would have to be enforced by
some other institution. But whatever institution did the enforcing would be obligated to privilege
opinions held by people long dead over opinions held by Americans today and, so, would implicate the
dead hand problem. If these provisions were evil, then people alive today would still be confronted with
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the daunting question why they should respect those provisions rather than their present, all-thingsconsidered judgment.
Second, as discussed above, 458 there is a sense in which judicial supremacy is at war with
constitutionalism rather than with constitutional skepticism. Judicial supremacy privileges the dictates
of judges over constitutional commands. Put differently, when judges get it wrong, judicial supremacy
mandates constitutional disobedience.
The attack on judicial supremacy can nonetheless be formulated in a fashion that makes it an
important part of the skeptical tradition. It is again useful to distinguish between constitutional
provisions with determinate and indeterminate meaning.
Suppose first that the meaning of a constitutional provision is sufficiently indeterminate that it
fails to resolve a contested case. Then, as explained above, when judges have final authority, their
decision must be based on something other than constitutional law. At first, it might seem strange for
opponents of constitutional obligation to complain about this fact. After all, their core objection is to
the privileging of constitutional text. The problem, though, is that judges regularly claim that they are
not actually exercising power, but are instead merely doing what the Constitution requires. To the
extent that the public believes that this is so, their decisions have more prestige than they deserve.
Moreover, even if the public does not believe a word of it, the decisions are systematically less subject
to a democratic check than those of other officials.
One might suppose that these problems do not arise if the text is determinate. Even if it is,
though, judges might simply refuse to do what the text requires. When this happens, we run into the
problem that worried Hobbes and Madison. 459 The central promise of constitutionalism is that
agreement on a set of principles, usually incorporated in a constitutional text, can settle otherwise
destabilizing disagreement at the political level. Unfortunately, though, as soon as people begin to
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complain that others are ignoring constitutional text, this promise can no longer be kept. Obviously,
settlement will not be achieved if everyone can insist on her own version of the Constitution. Hence,
the need for an authoritative interpreter. But if the interpreter is in fact authoritative, then we are not
committed to constitutional obedience after all, but instead to the hierarchical order produced by
obedience to the dictates of the interpreter – dictates that might actually violate the Constitution.
5. Realizability. The dilemma of judicial supremacy leads directly to the final strand of
constitutional skepticism – the problem of implementation. Even if constitutions are good, and even
they are somehow democratically legitimate, how are they to be enforced? Social stability demands
public institutions powerful enough to coerce recalcitrant individuals who want to reject collective
judgments. But once empowered, how are these institutions to be restrained? To paraphrase Madison,
public spirited officials require no constitutional constraints, while officials who are more willful and selfinterested are unlikely to respond to them. 460 In either case, it seems doubtful that constitutional
obligation makes much of a difference.
One might suppose that this worry is refuted by facts on the ground. We do not see American
Presidents regularly jailing their political opponents or cancelling elections. Congress does not pass
statutes that establish an official religion, and the Supreme Court does not hold people in contempt
when they criticize its opinions.
But this overlap between official behavior and constitutional commands does not demonstrate
causation. To prove that constitutions are effective, constitutionalists must show not just that the
behavior of public officials corresponds to what constitutions require, but also that the officials behave
this way because of the constitutional requirement. Put differently, they would have to show that
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officials who had the power and the motive to do something that the Constitution prohibits regularly
abstain from this behavior just because of the constitutional prohibition. 461
In fact, there are many constraints on public officials that have nothing to do with constitutional
obligation. Consider all the things that the Constitution permits but that officials nonetheless abstain
from doing. Congress does not refuse to appropriate money funding the President’s press secretary or
reduce the size of the Supreme Court to two justices. The President does not threaten to veto every bill
that Congress enacts unless he gets his way. Supreme Court justices do not campaign for political
candidates and have, on occasion, made extraordinary efforts not interfere with a sitting President’s
domestic programs. 462 These actions are not prevented by constitutional obedience because the
Constitution does not prohibit them. (In fact, in the case of judicial efforts to avoid confrontation with a
President, the Court’s actions may be in tension with constitutional obligation as the justices themselves
understand it). Instead, the restraint comes from some combination of political calculation, habit, moral
inhibition, and fear of retaliation. Why should we suppose that the same forces would not prevent
other kinds of overreaching even if there were no Constitution?
In recent years, inhibitions against extraordinary measures of this kind have begun to erode as a
more Manichean conception of American politics takes hold. 463 Perhaps the inhibitions will eventually
collapse completely. If they do, though, it is foolish to suppose that constitutional text will save us.
Ultimately, a political community requires forbearance, compromise, empathic connection, and a sense
of a shared fate to survive. Once these disappear, ancient words subject to radically different
interpretations and with doubtful connection to our present circumstances are unlike to save it.
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B. The Common Core of Constitutional Skepticism
In the previous section, I arranged the various skeptical arguments in a fashion designed to
demonstrate an overlap between them. At the very least, the varieties of skepticism share a family
resemblance. In this section, I hope to go beyond this claim and demonstrate that they also share a
common core. My strategy is to start by exploring the relationship between constitutional skepticism
and a more global skepticism about the possibility of right answers to political and moral problems.
Although not logically required, as a contingent historical fact, American constitutional skepticism has
often been associated with a rejection of global skepticism. That linkage, in turn, unifies the various
strands of skeptical argument and connects them to American optimism about the possibility of moral
progress.
1. Constitutional and global skepticism. Global moral and political skepticism takes a variety of
different forms. Some skeptics doubt the possibility of objective moral truth and think of moral
assertions as having the same status as claims about tastes and wants. Others, who concede at least
arguendo, the possibility of moral truth doubt the possibility of reliably discovering it. Still other
skeptics think that moral truths lack the kind of uncontroversial foundation that would allow us to
discuss them and come to agreement on what they are. 464
Whatever form this global skepticism takes, there is an apparent link between it and
constitutional skepticism. After all, if there is no good reason to believe that any action is morally
required, how can one believe that constitutional obedience is so required? 465
People who insist on this linkage are not making a logical mistake. Viewed from a certain angle,
there is indeed an association between moral and constitutional skepticism. But although the
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association is a permissible one, it is not compelled. It is also possible to base constitutional skepticism
on a rejection of global skepticism.
Two of Oliver Wendell Holmes most famous dissents illustrate how global skepticism can point
in opposite directions. Holmes’ traumatic experiences during the Civil War left him with a deep
suspicion of claims to immutable moral truth. 466 In his dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New York, this
skepticism led him to reject the effort to constitutionalize freedom of contract. Claiming that “[g]eneral
propositions do not decide concrete cases,” and that legal decisions “will depend on a judgment or
intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise,” he doubted that one could reason to this
constitutional outcome. Because the constitution was “made for people of fundamentally differing
views,” judges should be slow to “prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion.” 467 Yet in his
dissent in Abrams v. United States, this same skepticism led Holmes to constitutionalize protection for
speech freedoms. Just because “time has upset many fighting faiths,” therefore “the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas.” 468
John Dewey’s evolving ideas about constitutionalism demonstrate the same point. Dewey’s
adherence to Pragmatism left him skeptical about permanent, noninstrumental conceptions of truth.
Early in his career, this skepticism led him to denigrate constitutional protection for individual rights. 469
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After World War I, the same skepticism about deep moral foundations caused him to celebrate civil
liberties and the openness of American society. 470
The writings of Dewey and Holmes demonstrate that there is no necessary association between
global and constitutional skepticism. Global skepticism might cause one to be skeptical about
constitutional obligation, but it also might cause one to substitute “local knowledge” or norms within a
conventional practice for moral foundations. Put differently, if there is no foundational truth that all
must accept, then all we are left with is norms for particular communities like those contained in a
national constitutional. Conversely, moral realism is compatible with the view that there is a
foundational, moral obligation to obey a constitutional text, but it might also cause one to disobey the
text if it is thought that the text was inconsistent with foundational moral obligations.
As contingent, historical fact, many constitutionalists have been moral skeptics of one kind or
another, and many constitutional skeptics have believed in the possibility of moral truth. Consider first
the global skeptics who endorse constitutionalism. In his famous article defending constitutional
originalism, 471 Robert Bork began with the premise that moral philosophy could not resolve important
issues of public policy. On his view, there was “no principled way to prefer any claimed human value to
any other” or to “decide that one man's gratifications are more deserving of respect than another's or
that one form of gratification is more worthy than another.” 472 A person insisting on the right to sexual
intimacy with her spouse had the same status as an electric company insisting on providing low cost
power by polluting the air, he claimed. It was just because there was no way to make these
differentiations, Bork insisted, that judges acted illegitimately when they tried to discover fundamental
moral values and were obligated instead to enforce “neutral” constitutional text. 473
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Bork’s contemporary, John Hart Ely developed a very different but similarly influential version of
constitutionalism. 474 Whereas Bork emphasized constitutional text, Ely recognized the indeterminacy of
text alone and attempted to fill the lacuna by reference to the overall spirit and aims of the Constitution.
In his view, the Constitution was mostly about fair procedures. Courts acted appropriately when they
read the document to require such procedures, but not when they read into it their own moral
conceptions. 475 Strikingly, although his conclusions are very different, Ely’s analysis began precisely
where Bork’s does. He wrote that
If there is such a thing as natural law, and if it can be discovered, it would be folly . . . to ignore it
as a source of constitutional values. It's not nice to fool Mother Nature, and even Congress and
the President shouldn't be allowed to do so. We know it won't work, though. The idea is a
discredited one in our own society, and for good reason. “[A]ll theories of natural law have a
singular vagueness which is both an advantage and disadvantage in the application of the
theories.” The advantage, one gathers, is that you can invoke natural law to support anything
you want. The disadvantage is that everybody understands that. 476
Once again, it is just because argument about natural law solves nothing that, on Ely’s view, we
should instead resolve our differences by reference to the Constitution.
Still a third highly influential version of constitutionalism, John Rawls theory of political
liberalism, is similarly grounded. 477 Rawls did not attack moral truth per se, but he despaired of the
ability of people in a diverse society to have reasoned discussions of what he called “comprehensive
doctrines.” 478 If we are to have civic peace rooted in justice, he claimed, we must forego moral
discussions of this sort and rely instead on an overlapping consensus, which he associated with
standard, western constitutionalism. 479
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Many constitutional skeptics have had a very different conception of moral truth and the
possibilities for moral argument. As discussed above, most skepticism is rooted in the problem of
constitutional evil, which, in turn, presupposes an ability to know and debate moral truth. The point is
most obvious with regard to the antebellum abolitionists. Abolitionism was closely associated with the
Second Great Awakening, the large-scale religious revival that gripped mid-nineteenth century
America. 480 Abolitionists infused their rhetoric with claims to moral truth. Garrison insisted that the
Constitution was a “pact with the devil,” 481 and Julia Ward Howe was confident that the slaves would
ultimately be freed because God’s “truth is marching on.”
Similarly, Jefferson, Lincoln and both Roosevelts had no qualms about using religious and moral
rhetoric to support their programs when they were in tension with constitutional obligation. Jefferson
had eccentric views about religion, but his defense of rebellion rested crucially on the “self evident
truth” that all men were “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights.” For years, while
Lincoln temporized about slavery, he presented himself as a constitutionalist. But the Lincoln we
remember is not the figure who in his first inaugural insisted on his constitutional obligation to protect
slavery where it already existed. It is, instead, the Lincoln of the second inaugural who invoked not the
Constitution, but the will of God to justify the bloody struggle against slavery:
The Almighty has His own purposes. "Woe unto the world because of offenses; for it must needs
be that offenses come, but woe to that man by whom the offense cometh." If we shall suppose
that American slavery is one of those offenses which, in the providence of God, must needs
come, but which, having continued through His appointed time, He now wills to remove, and
that He gives to both North and South this terrible war as the woe due to those by whom the
offense came, shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the
believers in a living God always ascribe to Him? Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, that
this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue until all the
wealth piled by the bondsman's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and
until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as
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was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said "the judgments of the Lord are true
and righteous altogether." 482
Theodore Roosevelt began his 1912 campaign with the claim that “We stand at Armageddon and we
battle for the Lord.” 483 In his first inaugural address, Franklin Roosevelt proclaimed that “The money
changers have fled from their high seats in the temple of our civilization. We may now restore that
temple to the ancient truths. The measure of the restoration lies in the extent to which we apply social
values more noble than mere monetary profit.” 484
2. Skepticism’s common core. This association of constitutional skepticism with claims to moral
truth helps to link what might otherwise seem like disparate skeptical arguments. At bottom,
constitutional skepticism rests on a rejection of the idea that constitutional text can bridge moral
disagreement. People have an obligation to investigate moral truth for themselves, and, when they do
so, they may discover that there is a gap between what the Constitution commands and moral
obligation. Hence, the problem of constitutional evil. Because this obligation cannot be delegated to
others, there is no just reason to give definitive weight to the mistaken views of prior generations.
Hence, the “dead hand” problem. Nor can moral disagreement be bridged by open-ended constitutional
language (the indeterminacy problem). Indeterminate language cannot provide settlement without a
final interpreter (the judicial supremacy problem), and there is no more reason to accede to mistaken
judgments by such an interpreter than to mistaken judgments by prior generations. The upshot is that
constitutional law simply cannot make good on its promise to resolve disagreement and hold the
country together (the realizability problem).
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This is the negative side of constitutional skepticism. There is also a positive side. Skeptics claim
not just that the Constitution is ineffective, but also that it is unnecessary. They have a deep faith that
we can in fact make moral progress and come to moral agreement if only we listen carefully enough to
each other and spend enough time and effort deliberating about what is to be done.
It is a mistake to suppose that belief in the possibilities of moral judgment and argument are
necessarily associated with intolerance and absolutism, although that is surely a risk. Constitutional
skeptics believe that the risks on the other side are more serious. The American Constitution has
encouraged intolerance of views that cannot easily be reconciled with a very old text. In a world where
we did not have a constitution to hold us together, we would be obliged to develop habits of tolerance,
compromise, and critical introspection that are necessary to live with others of different views.
Ultimately, perhaps counterintuitively, constitutional skepticism rests on an optimistic view of
human freedom and sociability. Skeptics claim that we do not need the authoritarian commands of
outsiders to know right from wrong or live in peace with each other. Instead, we have the capacity and
duty to make our own judgments in a way that is loyal to our deepest commitments while also
respecting our fellow citizens and maintaining political community.
It is easy to see how someone might view these ideas as naïve, foolish, dangerous, or even
incoherent. It is much harder to claim that they are un-American or have played no role in our history
and tradition. On the contrary, for better or worse, they are central to (one version of) who we are.
III. Evaluating Constitutional Skepticism
What are we to make of this skeptical argument? The purpose of this article is to lay the
groundwork that would make possible a debate about constitutional skepticism, not to actually conduct
that debate. For that reason, and because I have laid out my views in detail elsewhere, 485 this Part is
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very brief. Nonetheless, it is possible to suggest few tentative conclusions that might be helpful in
structuring the debate.
The history I recount above puts the lie to the argument that for better or worse, the American
Constitution is essential to legitimate and stable government in the United States or that without it, civil
liberties would disappear. Constitutional skeptics have been around as long as we have had a
Constitution. The Constitution has regularly been denigrated, defied, and ignored. Yet we have not yet
seen the collapse that many predict.
Of course, there are also important episodes in our history where civil liberties, at least arguably
protected by the Constitution, have been violated. There is good reason to celebrate constitutional
departures by Jefferson, Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt, but few people today admire Richard Nixon’s
abuse of executive power during the Watergate episode, the incarceration of opponents of World War I,
McCarthyism’s assault on free speech rights, or, indeed, Roosevelt’s internment of Japanese Americans.
The George W. Bush administration’s assertions of untrammeled executive authority to intercept phone
calls between Americans and indefinitely incarcerate enemy combatants with no access to judicial
review are still a recent memory.
Opponents of each of these programs and actions marshaled constitutional arguments against
them. It must be remembered, however, that advocates for the actions and programs had
constitutional arguments of their own, some of which were endorsed by the Supreme Court. 486 The
important question is whether the country was well served by having these advocates and their critics
debate the issues in terms of constitutional obligation.
There is little evidence that the bare assertion that, say, the prosecution of World War I
dissenters violated constitutional language was effective in convincing people who otherwise favored
these prosecutions that they were wrong. Rather than changing position, advocates of the prosecutions
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simply advanced constitutional interpretations of their own – interpretations that, as it happened, were
endorsed by the Supreme Court. 487 When the country was eventually convinced that it had made a
mistake, the explanation was almost surely the waning of emergency conditions, rather than
constitutional argument. To the extent that argument mattered at all, the argument that worked was
not about mere constitutional obligation, but about the importance of free speech, dissent, open
debate, and tolerance. These virtues are crucial, whether or not the Constitution commands them.
In any event, whatever the historical record shows, there is good reason to believe that main
danger that we face today comes from constitution worship rather than constitutional skepticism. The
danger takes two contradictory forms. First, just because people regularly translate their ordinary
political disagreements into constitutional rhetoric, constitution worship inflames political discourse.
People who have different views about, say, national healthcare or federal power are not just wrong.
They are traitors who reject the very idea of America as embodied in its sacred constitution.
The second source of danger comes from the opposite direction. As discussed above, 488 the use
of hyperbolic constitutional rhetoric coexists with widespread cynicism about the politicization of
constitutional discourse. Even while they accuse their enemies of violating the constitutional compact,
many Americans also understand that constitutional law is regularly used for partisan political purposes.
Why else would the news media regularly identify Justices and lower court judges with reference to the
President who appointed them, and why else would nomination hearings turn into pitched political
battle? 489
So constitution worship gives us the worst of both worlds. On the one hand, it inflames political
rhetoric. On the other, it leads to disillusionment about the very possibility of transcending immediate
political struggle.
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This is not to say that constitutionalism always and necessarily plays these roles. In certain
times and places, constitutions can be a goad to political reform, a rallying cry for the dispossessed, a
means of forging a nation out of disparate groups. We need to make contextual judgments about the
value of constitutionalism and of the skeptical arguments that oppose constitutionalism. 490
Nor is it to say that a change in attitude toward the Constitution would solve all of our political
dysfunction. There are many reasons why our politics has become polarized and gridlocked. Still, there
is reason to think that we would benefit from a revival of constitutional skepticism. The skeptical
tradition insists that we come to grips with our political disagreements without trying to shut down
opposing argument with what amounts to an authoritarian insistence that one is obligated to act in a
certain way whether or not one agrees just because someone else has so commanded. It emphasizes
the fact that it is for us, the living, to decide what kind of country we want, that it is deeply wrong to
deny our own freedom to make these decisions, and that we cannot look to others long dead to solve
our problems. This freedom in turn gives rise to an obligation to understand and compromise with our
political adversaries. Constitutional skepticism, taken seriously, has the potential to energize our politics
while helping us to respect our opponents.
Conclusion
The most powerful argument for constitutionalism rests on the need all political entities have to
tell a coherent story about themselves over time. Thus, the United States is not just a collection of
people who happen to inhabit the same physical space. We are a nation – a People -- and not just a
random collection of people. To be a People, we need a common history and, it is said, the Constitution
is at the center of our history.
There is, of course, some truth to this story, but the key to the skeptical argument is the
recognition that there are other stories as well. Suppose we grant that a People needs a common
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history extending over time. This history is not just something that exists. It is constructed and
reconstructed through political struggle. There is a version of our history that emphasizes constitutional
obedience, but there is also a version, more than adequately supported by actual historical events, that
emphasizes continual struggle against constitutional authority. We have a choice as to which version to
embrace.
I have said that this realization is a prelude to discussion, rather than discussion itself. Still, it is
also true that once one understands that there really is a choice, in some sense the choice has already
been made. The argument for constitutional obedience ultimately rests on a perception of
powerlessness. The Constitution is just there; we are stuck with it, whether we like it or not, because it
is part of the history that defines who we are.

Once one sees that we in fact have power to define for

ourselves who we are, this argument collapses.
All that remains, then, is to summon the courage to use the power that we have always already
had.

